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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Assume that you have just accepted an associate attorney position at a 
top-notch national law firm with offices on the east coast and on the 
west coast, and with clients in several different states throughout 
America.  Instead of the standard $125,000 a year starting salary for an 
associate with your stellar credentials, your starting salary is only 
$95,000, but the law firm persuaded you to take the job by promising a 
nice bonus if your yearly billable hours totaled at least 2500 hours.  To 
further sweeten the pie, the law firm promised that you would receive 
the best health insurance with extensive medical coverage and no 
deductibles. 
On the first day of work at the law firm, while filling out various 
employment papers, you discovered that the law firm offers, as an 
employee benefit plan, only one Health Maintenance Organization 
(HMO) funded by an insurance policy from an insurance company.  
And, to obtain the promised heath coverage, you must enroll in that 
HMO.  Being young, healthy, and smart, you enrolled in the HMO, 
thinking that you probably would not need medical care before your one 
year anniversary with the firm, which was the length of time that you 
expected to work for that law firm.  However, two months into that job, 
you developed severe stomach pains.  Your HMO primary care physician 
diagnosed an ulcer, that he attributed to stress from your having to work 
so hard as a beginning associate, and prescribed medication to treat the 
condition.  When the pain would not go away, that physician treated 
your pain by prescribing different types of medication over the next six-
month period.  Finally, after some prodding, the physician telephoned 
the HMO’s utilization reviewers and requested authorization to send you 
to a specialist.   
However, the utilization reviewers rejected the request because they 
believed that a specialist was not medically necessary.  Therefore, the 
primary care physician continued his efforts to control your pain by 
prescribing yet another type of medication.  But, the pain would not go 
away.  So, on your own volition and at your own expense, you went to a 
specialist.  After several x-rays and other diagnostic procedures, the 
specialist diagnosed stomach cancer and scheduled you for immediate 
surgery.  The specialist told you that the primary care physician’s failure 
to diagnose the stomach cancer when he first treated you has caused a 
thirty-three percent reduction in your chance of survival and that, given 
the specific type of cancer, your prognosis is not good. 
You engaged an attorney who filed a five million dollar lawsuit 
against the HMO and the primary care physician, alleging general 
negligence against the former and medical malpractice against the latter.  
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Months into the litigation, the physician gave you a nice settlement.  
However, the HMO filed a motion for summary judgment against you, 
alleging that the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)1 
preempts your state tort lawsuit and that your only recourse is to file a 
federal lawsuit under ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions,  where your 
damages will be limited to the monetary value of the denied benefit—
which at a minimum will be the $150.00 out of pocket expense that you 
incurred when you first saw the specialist, and which at a maximum will 
be the total dollar amount you spent on all medical care from the 
 
 1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2000).  An ERISA plan is any medical benefit plan 
that an employer offers to  its employees and beneficiaries when the employer’s business 
affects interstate commerce.  29 U.S.C § 1002 (2000).  When an employee or beneficiary 
who receives medical benefits under an ERISA plan suffers an injury because either the 
ERISA plan or an HMO administrator of the plan improperly denies medical benefits, 
the employee can bring a civil cause of action for damages under relevant state statutory 
or tort law.  Or, the employee may file a lawsuit under § 1132(a) of ERISA’s civil 
enforcement provisions.  29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000).  If the employee brings the lawsuit 
under state law, ERISA’s preemption clause will preempt it if it “relates to” the ERISA 
plan by having either a “reference to” or a “connection with” the plan.  See infra note 8 
and accompanying text.  See generally Larry J. Pittman, ERISA’s Preemption Clause: 
Progress Towards a More Equitable Preemption of State Laws, 34 IND. L. REV. 207, 216 
(2001) (discussing court cases that analyze whether various types of state statutory and 
tort laws are preempted by ERISA’s preemption clause). 
On the other hand, if the injured employee files a claim under § 1132(a) of ERISA’s 
civil enforcement provisions, the employee’s remedies are limited to either an injunction, 
a clarification of rights to the benefits, or a damage award that equals the monetary value 
of the benefits that were denied by the plan or its HMO administrator.  29 U.S.C. § 
1132(a).  However, because § 1132(a) does not allow compensatory and punitive 
damages, many injured employees will file state law claims and hope that they will 
escape ERISA’s preemption.  One way to avoid ERISA’s preemption is to show that the 
state law claim is premised upon a state law insurance regulation under the protection of 
ERISA’s saving clause.  29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000).  There will be no preemption 
if the saving clause does protect the law or lawsuit, and the employee may pursue a state 
law claim.  However, the employee still might not be able to get compensatory and 
punitive damages if the claim for damages conflicts with the types of limited remedies 
that § 1132(a) offers.  This is so because the Supreme Court has implied that one cannot 
use the saving clause to protect a state law or lawsuit from preemption when that state 
law or lawsuit seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, or both, as such damages 
are not allowed under § 1132(a).  Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51–57 
(1987). 
Therefore, the main purpose of this Article is to show that, pursuant to a plain meaning 
interpretation of ERISA’s saving clause and preemption clause, the Court should hold 
that a state law or lawsuit that falls within the scope of the saving clause escapes 
preemption by both ERISA’s preemption clause and by § 1132(a)’s civil enforcement 
remedies.  In other words, § 1132(a) does not preempt the field of permissible remedies 
for an injured employee.  Rather, an employee whose lawsuit falls within ERISA’s 
saving clause’s scope should be able to obtain compensatory and punitive damages.  This 
article is dedicated to proving the accuracy of that conclusion. 
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specialist.  The HMO cited case law establishing that you are not entitled 
to compensatory and punitive damages because such damages are not 
allowable under § 1132(a) of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions.2  
While researching your response to the motion, you and your lawyer 
discovered a state statute providing the following: 
(1) Each Health Maintenance Organization shall provide a mechanism for the 
timely review by a physician holding the same class of license as the primary 
care physician, who is unaffiliated with the [HMO], jointly selected by the 
patient . . ., primary care physician and the [HMO] in the event of a dispute 
between the primary care physician and the [HMO] regarding the medical 
necessity of a covered service proposed by a primary care physician.  In the 
event that the reviewing physician determines the covered service to be 
medically necessary, the [HMO] shall provide the covered service.3 
(2) An HMO which does not inform its enrollees that they have the right to an 
independent external review as provided in subpart 1 above shall be liable for 
any compensatory damages that an enrollee suffers from being denied an 
external review. 
Therefore, the lawyer amended your complaint to add a state statutory 
cause of action for the HMO’s failure to inform you that you had a right 
to an independent external review of the HMO’s denial of your primary 
care physician’s request for a referral to the specialist.  In response, the 
HMO’s lawyers amended the HMO’s motion for summary judgment to 
allege that ERISA preempts the state statutory claim because § 1132(a) 
of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions provides the only cause of 
action for the alleged improper denial of the specialist, and that § 
1132(a) does not provide for compensatory damages.4  The trial judge 
granted the motion for summary judgment, accepting the HMO’s 
arguments regarding the scope of § 1132(a) and its impact on your case.  
The relevant federal circuit court of appeals affirmed.  You are now 
contemplating whether you should file a writ of certiorari seeking review 
before the Supreme Court of the United States. 
Your attorney tells you that several of ERISA’s statutory provisions 
will influence the Court’s decision if it accepts the appeal.  ERISA’s 
preemption clause, § 1144(a), provides that certain provisions of ERISA 
will “supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or 
 
 2. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 261 (1993) (asserting that one is 
not entitled to compensatory damages under § 1132(a)).  Throughout this Article, 
references are made to § 1132(a) of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions,  instead of to 
§ 502(a), which is frequently cited in court opinions instead of § 1132(a).  However, 
these two cites refer to the exact same ERISA statutory provision.  See Pittman, supra 
note 1, at 211. 
 3. Section one of this hypothetical statute is exactly the same as the Illinois 
independent review statute that the Court, in Rush v. Prudential HMO, Inc., v. Moran, 
536 U.S. 355, 361 (2002), upheld as not being preempted by § 1132(a) of ERISA’s civil 
enforcement provisions.  Id. at 386–87. 
 4. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 254–55; Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54. 
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hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan” affecting interstate 
commerce.5  ERISA’s saving clause, § 1144(b)(2)(A), states that 
“[e]xcept as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this subchapter 
shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any 
State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.”6  And, § 1132(a) 
of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions establishes, in part, that a 
beneficiary of an employee benefit plan may bring a federal civil action 
“to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce 
his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future 
benefits under the terms of the plan.”7 
The attorney tells you that, given that your state law statutory claim 
“relates to” your health plan,8 which is an ERISA protected plan, the 
Court will reverse the lower court’s dismissal of the lawsuit only if it 
finds that ERISA’s saving clause prevents the lawsuit from being 
preempted by § 1132(a) of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions.  As 
such, your appeal presents a case of first impression on an issue that is 
tantamount to the last frontier of ERISA preemption jurisprudence.  The 
primary issue is whether Congress has the legislative authority, despite 
the dictates of the Supremacy Clause, to enact a saving clause that 
exempt state laws from preemption even when such laws directly 
conflict with one of ERISA’s statutory provisions.  A resolution of this 
issue in the affirmative would continue the Court’s erosion of the scope 
of ERISA’s preemption, and it would pay homage to the much needed 
changes that have already occurred in this area of federal preemption.9 
 
 5. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). 
 6. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).  Throughout this Article, the Author uses the 
phrases “saving clause-protected state law” and “saving clause-protected law.”  These 
phrases mean that the state law regulates insurance under the terms of ERISA’s saving 
clause by satisfying the two-prong test that the Court established in Kentucky Ass’n of 
Health, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 341–42 (2003). 
 7. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000). 
 8. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).  Under ERISA’s preemption clause, a state law “relate[s] 
to” an ERISA plan if it has a “reference to” or a “connection with” an ERISA plan.  
Larry J. Pittman, “Any Willing Provider” Laws and ERISA’s Saving Clause: A New 
Solution For an Old Problem, 64 TENN. L. REV. 409, 427 n.83 (1997).  A “connection 
with” exists when a state law “chang[es] the structure or the administration of the plan.”  
Id.  As such, the hypothetical state statute (given that it imposes an independent external 
review process upon an HMO’s benefit review procedures) changes the structure of an 
ERISA plan, thereby establishing a “connection with” the plan that is sufficient enough 
for ERISA to preempt the statute unless ERISA’s saving clause exempt the law from 
preemption.  See id. 
 9. See generally Pittman, supra note 1, at 237–68 (discussing cases that have 
reduced the scope of ERISA’s preemption clause). 
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Most of that change has involved the direction in which the Court has 
taken its interpretation of the phrase “relate to” as contained in ERISA’s 
express preemption clause.  Changing course after approximately 
twenty-five years of expansively interpreting the preemption clause, the 
Court has moved from a very broad interpretation of “relate to,” as 
announced in Pilot Life v. Dedeaux,10 to a more practical, case-by-case 
evaluation that principally asks whether a disputed state law interferes 
with ERISA’s purposes and objectives, as discussed in New York State 
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance 
Co.11  If the state law does not interfere with such purposes then there 
will be no ERISA preemption of the law.  As such, the Court has 
significantly narrowed the scope of ERISA’s preemption.12  And, the 
shifting of interpretation from the broad to the narrow has led to a 
plethora of state and federal court opinions that find no ERISA 
preemption of various state statutes and common law theories that 
regulate managed care organizations.13 
In addition to the narrowing of the preemption clause’s scope, the 
Court has broadened the parameters of ERISA’s saving clause, which 
may mean that the saving clause will exempt more state laws from 
ERISA’s preemption.14  This Article takes a closer look at the Court’s 
recent pronouncements regarding the saving clause and makes several 
assertions about the future path that the Court’s saving clause 
jurisprudence should take.  Primarily, this Article concludes that the 
Court’s interpretation of the saving clause should be even broader than it 
presently is, so much so that the saving clause, when applicable, should 
preempt § 1132(a) of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions.  In other 
 
 10. 481 U.S. 41, 47–49 (1987). 
 11. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).  As a first look, the Court will still apply the definition of 
“relate to,” “reference to” or “connection with,” to see if it will “manifestly and clearly” 
answer the interpretative question.  See Pittman, supra note 1, at 224 n.87.  If such an 
analysis is insufficient, the Court will then evaluate the state law’s impact on ERISA’s 
purposes and objectives, principally the preemption clause’s purpose of providing for 
uniform regulation of ERISA plans.  See id. 
 12. Principally, there are two purposes that underlie ERISA.  First, the general 
purpose of the statute is to create a statutory scheme that protects employees and other 
beneficiaries from an employer’s or other benefit plan manager’s fraud and abuse in 
managing an employee benefit plan.  See Larry J. Pittman, ERISA’s Preemption Clause 
and the Health Care Industry: An Abdication of Judicial Law-Creating Authority, 46 
FLA. L. REV. 355, 357–61 (1994).  Second, the purpose of ERISA’s preemption clause is 
to create a national uniformity of the regulation of ERISA benefit plans such that an 
interstate plan will be able to operate under one set of rules and regulations without the 
financial cost or other inefficiencies that would result from different regulations by 
different states.  See id. 
 13. See Pittman, supra note 1, at 237–68 (analyzing lawsuits and theories that 
escape preemption under the Court’s new approach to ERISA’s preemption). 
 14. See infra notes 16–26 and accompanying text. 
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words, the arguments that appear below establish that the Court should 
reverse the lower court’s dismissal of the above-referenced hypothetical 
lawsuit. 
Part II discusses the Court’s most recent opinion interpreting ERISA’s 
saving clause and it explains some of the possible implications flowing 
from that opinion.  Part III shows how indecisive the Court has been 
when interpreting the saving clause, and it emphasizes how the Court 
has gone from a very broad to a more narrow interpretation of the clause.  
Part IV asserts that the Court should apply a plain meaning interpretation 
of  the saving clause, one that extends the clause’s application to the 
fullest extent of the Congressional intent that underlie the clause.  Lastly, 
Part V concludes that the Court should not be concerned that a broad, 
plain meaning interpretation of the saving clause might lead to some 
state laws preempting such ERISA statutory provisions as § 1132(a) of 
ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions, and that, if such destruction were 
to occur, it would be in furtherance of Congress’ intent that states should 
have broad authority when regulating insurance. 
II.  A SAVING CLAUSE PROGRESSION TOWARDS MORE FEDERALISM 
ERISA’s saving clause states: “Except as provided in subparagraph 
(B), nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve 
any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, 
banking, or securities.”15  The Court’s most recent decision interpreting 
ERISA’s saving clause shows that the Court may be moving towards a 
more expansive interpretation.  In Kentucky Ass’n of Health, Inc. v. 
Miller,16 the Court held that the saving clause exempted Kentucky’s 
“Any Willing Provider” (AWP) law from ERISA’s preemption.17  
Arguably, this decision enlarges the scope of ERISA’s saving clause, 
and it should lead to more state laws being exempted from preemption.  
The expansion of the saving clause’s scope is evidenced by the Court’s 
adoption of a new two-prong test for determining when a state law is 
exempted from preemption: (1) “the state law must be specifically 
directed toward entities engaged in insurance,” and (2) “the state law 
must substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement between the 
 
 15. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000). 
 16. 538 U.S. 329 (2003). 
 17. See id. at 335–36. 
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insurer and the insured.”18 
Analytically, courts should not encounter much difficulty when 
applying the first prong.19  But, the second prong—“substantially affect 
the risk pooling arrangement”—is more challenging.  First, in Miller, the 
Court abandoned the use of the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s (MFA) three-
factor analysis because ERISA’s saving clause’s language requires only 
that a state law “regulates insurance,” and not that the law regulates a 
practice that is a part of “the business of insurance,” as required by the 
MFA.20 
This distinction, between the language of the saving clause and the 
language of the MFA, arguably expands the types of laws that ERISA’s 
saving clause will protect from preemption.  One category of protected 
laws consists of laws that impose preconditions on insurance companies’ 
and other risk-bearing entities’ permission to conduct business within a 
state.  AWP laws fall within that category; and therefore, they escape 
ERISA’s preemption, under the Miller Court’s rationale. 
By expanding the number of providers from whom an insured may receive 
health services, AWP laws alter the scope of permissible bargains between 
insurers and insureds in a manner similar to the mandated-benefit laws we 
upheld in Metropolitan Life, the notice-prejudice rule we sustained in UNUM, 
and the independent-review provisions we approved in Rush Prudential.  No 
longer may Kentucky insureds seek insurance from a closed network of health-
care providers in exchange for a lower premium.  The AWP prohibition 
substantially affects the type of risk pooling arrangements that insurers may 
offer.21 
 
 18. Id. at 1479.  Prior to Miller, the Court interpreted ERISA’s saving clause by 
applying both a  “common sense” understanding of “regulates insurance” and the three-
factor analysis under the McCarran-Ferguson Act: (1) “‘whether the practice has the 
effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder’s risk’”; (2) “‘whether the practice is an 
integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured’”; and (3) 
“‘whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry.’”  Pittman, 
supra note 8, at 440–41.  Given that the first and second factors of the three-factor 
analysis are no longer a part of an ERISA’s saving clause analysis, there is reason to 
believe that Miller’s new interpretation of the saving clause will exempt more laws from 
ERISA’s preemption. 
 19. The first prong has been a part of an ERISA’s saving clause analysis for more 
than a decade and therefore courts have developed some expertise in its application.  See 
Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 50 (asserting that, to regulate insurance, a state law “must be 
specifically directed toward that industry”).  See also Pittman, supra note 8, at 442–47 
(discussing cases that apply the first prong). 
 20. Miller, 538 U.S. at 339–40.  Apparently, the Court’s older cases incorporated 
the MFA’s three-factor analysis into an ERISA saving clause analysis because both the 
saving clause and the MFA appear to have the same purpose of granting states regulatory 
control over the insurance industry.  John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust and 
Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 100 (1993). 
 21. Miller, 538 U.S. at 338-39 (citations omitted).  However, there are some 
preconditions that will not “substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement” between 
the insured and insurer.  For example, in Miller, the Court referenced that ERISA’s 
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The gist of the above-quoted statement is that a state law’s preconditions 
or other obligations, such as an AWP law, must have a substantial 
impact on insurers’ and insureds’ abilities to negotiate for different types 
of insurance arrangements than the one that the state law mandates.  
However, beyond this broad statement, the scope of the “substantially 
affect the risk pooling arrangement” requirement is not clear; and, the 
Court must clarify that requirement on a case-by-case basis during future 
litigation.22 
But, a second category of state laws, those that mandate the terms and 
conditions of insurance arrangements, should easily meet the 
“substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement” test.  Like the AWP 
law at issue in Miller, mandated-benefit laws limit the types of policies 
and contracts that insurers can offer to their insureds.  Consistent with 
the Court’s prior opinion, these types of laws should continue their 
preemption-exempt status under Miller’s new two-prong test.23 
A third category of state laws that will normally satisfy the 
“substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement” requirement includes 
those laws that impose utilization review requirements, that establish 
external review obligations (like the above-referenced hypothetical 
statute), that mandate other procedures and conditions on the types of 
benefits that insurers must offer the insured, and that regulate the manner 
in which insurers must provide medical benefits.24 
 
saving clause would not exempt a hypothetical state law mandating that insurance 
companies pay their “janitors twice the minimum wage” because such a law would not 
have the requisite effect on the insured-insurer relationship.  Id. at 338.  But, the Court’s 
opinion regarding minimum wages lends itself to exceptions.  One could argue that, if in 
exchange for having to pay such wages, the insurer raises its premiums and changes the 
terms and conditions of its policies (by dropping certain coverage), even a minimum 
wage law might have a substantial impact on the risk pooling arrangement.  Therefore, 
generalization about the types of laws that the saving clause will protect are not helpful.  
Instead, a case-by-case evaluation of a disputed state law’s terms and conditions and the 
effects thereof on the insured-insurer’s relationship is necessary to determine whether the 
saving clause exempts a state law for ERISA’s preemption. 
 22. It seems that the “substantially affect” language is somewhat vague.  
Therefore, it is possible that, as with an ERISA’s preemption clause analysis, the Court 
might find that some state laws’ effect on the insured-insurer’s relation is “too tenuous, 
remote, or peripheral.”  Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983). 
 23. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 758 (1985) (holding 
that ERISA’s saving clause exempted a state’s mandated benefit law from ERISA’s 
preemption). 
 24. It seems that state laws falling within the scope of the third category of laws 
will satisfy the second prong of the Miller test because they limit the types of insurance 
arrangements into which insurers and insureds can enter.  See supra text accompanying 
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It appears that state laws that fall within the third category, similar to 
mandated-benefit laws, dictate the terms and conditions that insurers and 
the insured must include within their contractual arrangements.  These 
types of laws normally have a substantial effect on insurance contracts 
and other risk pooling arrangements between the insurer and the insured.  
Such effects might even impose substantial operating costs on insurers, 
including the costs of disputed medical benefits in states that have 
binding independent review requirements.25 
Given that at least section one of the above-referenced hypothetical 
state statute falls within the third category of saving clause-protected 
laws, ERISA’s saving clause will exempt section one from preemption.  
For example, in Rush v. Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran,26 the Court 
held that ERISA’s saving clause exempted from preemption the same 
type of binding independent external review requirement.27   
However, neither Rush nor Miller is dispositive on whether section 
two of the hypothetical state statute can grant compensatory damages 
when § 1132(a) of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions does not allow 
such damages.  At best, the real benefit of Miller might be that it shows 
that the Court can expansively interpret ERISA’s saving clause and can 
abandon old analytical tests like the MFA’s  three-factor analysis.  
 
note 18. 
 25. In Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002), the Court stated 
the following regarding the increase in operating cost that an HMO might suffer from 
being subjected to the state’s binding independent review procedures: 
And although the added compliance cost to the HMO may ultimately be passed 
on to the ERISA plan, we have said that such “indirect economic  effects,” are 
not enough to preempt state regulation even outside of the insurance context.  
We recognize, of course, that a State might enact an independent review 
requirement with procedures so elaborate, and burdens so onerous, that they 
might undermine §1132(a).  No such system is before us. 
Id. at 381 n.11 (quoting N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 659 (1995)).   
In addition to the added costs of having to institute procedures consistent with a state’s 
binding independent review procedures—costs that an HMO directly bears, and that 
ERISA plans indirectly bear when the HMO shifts the cost to the plans—binding 
external reviews have the potential of shifting the final decisions on who bears the risk of 
loss from the insurer to an external reviewer who may be more receptive to the insureds’ 
claims for benefits because the external reviewer will not normally have the same 
conflict of interest that insurers generally have.  This shifting of the decisions on who 
bears the risk of loss might ultimately take benefits out of the plan that would  remain in 
the plan under a system without independent external review. 
At the end of the day, the Rush majority did not find that either the costs of instituting 
a binding independent review procedure, or the ultimate cost of the risk of loss when an 
external reviewer reverses an HMO’s benefit decision, warranted a conclusion that 
ERISA’s saving clause did not exempt the state law at issue in Rush because of an 
alleged conflict with the purposes of  § 1132(a).  Id. at 386–87. 
 26. 536 U.S. 355 (2002). 
 27. See id. at 387. 
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Additionally, Miller can serve as a good springboard from which the 
Court will start interpreting ERISA’s saving clause as broadly as 
Congress intended.  Along these lines, the Court should give ERISA’s 
saving clause an interpretation that is even broader than Miller.  More 
specifically, the Court should recognize and enforce Congress’ intent 
that states should have the authority under ERISA’s saving clause to 
grant remedies to the insured that are inconsistent with § 1132(a) of 
ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions. 
Such recognition has much implication for the above-referenced 
hypothetical lawsuit.  First, Rush is precedent that ERISA’s saving 
clause would protect section one of the hypothetical state statute from 
ERISA’s preemption.  But, given that Rush did not involve a provision 
like section two of the hypothetical statute, it is not sufficient authority 
that section two escapes preemption.  Therefore, one must review other 
relevant cases to see whether they resolve the ultimate issue of whether a 
state law can successfully provide compensatory and punitive damages 
that conflict with § 1132(a), a section that does not provide for such 
remedies.   
However, a brief analysis of the Court’s saving clause jurisprudence 
shows that the Court has not been consistent in its interpretation of the 
clause—alternating between a broad and a narrow interpretation.  This 
analysis reveals that the Court appears more likely to give a narrow 
interpretation of the saving clause when there is a conflict between a 
state law and § 1132(a), as section two of the hypothetical state statute 
presents.  The Court’s predisposition is primarily based upon the Court’s 
mistaken belief about the scope and the application of the Supremacy 
Clause.28 
III.  THE COURT’S INDECISIVENESS OVER THE SCOPE OF ERISA’S 
SAVING CLAUSE 
A.  A Broad Interpretation 
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts,29 the Court, for 
 
 28. Harris Trust, 510 U.S. at 98 (“ERISA leaves room for complementary or dual 
federal and state regulation, and calls for federal supremacy when the two regimes 
cannot be harmonized or accommodated.”); see also Rush Prudential HMO, 536 U.S. at 
377 (asserting, in dictum, that when a conflict arises between a saving clause-protected 
state law and § 1132(a) remedies, the state law “los[es] out”). 
 29. 471 U.S. 724 (1985). 
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the first time, engaged in a substantive analysis of ERISA’s saving 
clause—one that was outcome determinant.30  The Court held that 
ERISA’s saving clause exempted from preemption a Massachusetts state 
law mandating that insurance companies provide “specified minimum 
mental-health-care benefits” to their insured.31  The Court held that the 
saving clause was applicable because the state law “regulate[d] the terms 
of certain insurance contracts,” thereby meeting the “common-sense 
view” of an insurance regulation.32  Significantly, the Metropolitan Life 
Court opposed a narrow reading of the saving clause when it rejected an 
argument that the saving clause is applicable only when a state law does 
not conflict with one of ERISA’s substantive provisions.33  Instead, the 
Court used a plain meaning interpretation of ERISA’s saving clause, and 
of ERISA’s deemer clause, to support its opinion that there were no 
limitations on the saving clause other than the deemer clause and the 
saving clause’s own language.34  As such, Metropolitan Life’s broad 
interpretation of the saving clause supports an argument that a saving 
clause-protected state law trumps even inconsistent ERISA substantive 
provisions.35 
Subsequently, the Court continued its broad interpretation of the 
saving clause in FMC Corp. v. Holliday36 in which the Court held that 
 
 30. See id. at 739–47. 
 31. See id. at 727, 744. 
 32. Id. at 740. 
 33. See id. at 746–47.  In Metropolitan Life, the Court rejected the lower court’s 
contention that the saving clause “save[s] only state regulation unrelated to the 
substantive provisions of ERISA”; or that it is applicable only when a state law “directly 
regulate[s] the insurer,” or when it regulates such “matters as the way in which insurance 
may be sold.”  Id. at 746–47, 741. 
 34. See id. at 746.  The Court stated: 
   We therefore decline to impose any limitation on the saving clause beyond 
those Congress imposed in the clause itself and in the “deemer clause” which 
modifies it.  If a state law “regulates insurance,” as mandated-benefit laws do, 
it is not preempted.  Nothing in the language, structure, or legislative history 
of the Act supports a more narrow reading of the clause, whether it be the 
Supreme Judicial Court’s attempt to save only state regulations unrelated to 
the substantive provisions of ERISA, or the insurers’ more speculative attempt 
to read the saving clause out of the statute. 
Id. at 746–47 (emphasis added).  This quote from Metropolitan Life directly addresses 
the conflict between § 1132(a) and a saving clause-protected state law.  In effect, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reasoned that the saving clause would not protect 
a state law that conflicts with one of ERISA’s substantive provisions, which includes § 
1132(a).  See id.  However, the majority opinion in Metropolitan Life did not accept such 
a limitation.  See id.  In other words, the Court, by implication, held that the saving 
clause, when applicable, being limited only by its language and the deemer clause, 
exempts state laws from preemption even when they conflict with one of ERISA’s 
substantive provisions, such as § 1132(a). 
 35. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.  For a further discussion of the 
deemer clause, see infra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 36. 498 U.S. 52 (1990). 
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ERISA’s saving clause would have saved a Pennsylvania anti-
subrogation law had the ERISA plan not been self-insured.37  Although 
not specifically addressing whether the anti-subrogation law conflicted 
with § 1132(a), the Holliday Court stated that the only limitation on the 
application of ERISA’s saving clause is ERISA’s deemer clause.38  The 
Court stated: “Unless the statute is excluded from the reach of the saving 
clause by virtue of the deemer clause, therefore, it is not pre-empted.”39  
The Court further reasoned that “the saving and deemer clauses employ 
differing language to achieve their ends—the former saving, except as 
provided in the deemer clause, ‘any law of any State which regulates 
insurance.’”40 
A fair reading of these statements from Holliday supports a conclusion 
that ERISA’s saving clause’s preemptive effects are such that a state 
law, which is within the coverage of the saving clause, preempts ERISA’s 
own statutory provisions given that ERISA’s deemer clause is the only 
limitation on the scope of the saving clause.  That conclusion is 
consistent with the Court’s opinion in Metropolitan Life,41 and it means 
that § 1132(a) is not a limitation that would prevent a saving clause-
protected law from imposing remedies that are different than those 
contained in § 1132(a).  However, the Court soon found a way to 
backtrack from Metropolitan Life’s and Holliday’s broad interpretation 
of the saving clause. 
B.  A Narrow Interpretation 
In addition to Pilot Life’s holding that ERISA’s saving clause did not 
exempt Mississippi’s bad faith law from preemption,42 the Court’s 
dictum implied that one cannot use the saving clause to exempt a saving 
clause-protected law from preemption if the law conflicts with § 1132(a) 
of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions.43  As such, the Court held that 
ERISA’s saving clause did not save the bad faith lawsuit from 
preemption because the lawsuit sought compensatory and punitive 
 
 37. Id. at 61–62.  The state law prohibited insurance companies and health plans 
from obtaining subrogation of funds that ERISA beneficiaries obtain from third-party 
tortfeasors.  Id. at 55. 
 38. Id. at 61. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 64 (emphasis added). 
 41. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 42. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987). 
 43. See id. at 52–57. 
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damages that are not allowable under § 1132(a).44  Primarily, the Court 
used field preemption to assert that § 1132(a)’s remedies are the 
exclusive remedies for an alleged “improper processing” of a request for 
benefits under an ERISA plan.45 
One can argue that Pilot Life’s narrowing of the scope of ERISA’s 
saving clause is inconsistent with Metropolitan Life and Holliday.  In 
other words, Pilot Life asserted that § 1132(a) is a limitation on the 
scope of a state law that falls within the scope of ERISA’s saving clause, 
while Metropolitan Life and Holliday stated that the deemer clause is the 
only limitation on a saving clause-protected law.  Subsequently, the 
Court has indicated that it might follow Pilot Life’s narrow interpretation. 
For example, in John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Harris 
Trust and Savings Bank,46 a case of first impression, the Court 
considered the legal effects of a direct conflict between a saving clause-
protected state law and one of ERISA’s statutory provisions.47  At issue 
was a state law mandating that an insurance company manage its general 
accounts by considering “‘the interests of all of its contractholders, 
creditors and shareholders,’ [and that it] ‘maintain equity among its 
various constituencies.’”48  This state law conflicted with an ERISA 
fiduciary provision that requires that an ERISA fiduciary manage a plan 
 
 44. Id. at 54.  The Pilot Life Court stated: 
In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, . . . this Court rejected an 
interpretation of the saving clause of ERISA’s express pre-emption provisions, 
§ 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A), that saved from pre-emption “only 
state regulations unrelated to the substantive provisions of ERISA,” finding 
that “[n]othing in the language, structure, or legislative history of the Act” 
supported this reading of the saving clause.  Metropolitan Life, however, did 
not involve a state law that conflicted with a substantive provision of ERISA.  
Therefore the Court’s general observation—that state laws related to ERISA 
may also fall under the saving clause—was not focused on any particular 
relationship or conflict between a substantive provision of ERISA and a state 
law.  In particular, the Court had no occasion to consider in Metropolitan Life 
the question raised in the present case: whether Congress might clearly 
express, through the structure and legislative history of a particular substantive 
provision of ERISA, an intention that the federal remedy provided by that 
provision displace state causes of action.  Our resolution of this different 
question does not conflict with the Court’s earlier general observations in 
Metropolitan Life. 
Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 56–57. 
 45. Field preemption occurs when “the scheme of federal regulation is ‘so 
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States 
to supplement it.’”  Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) 
(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
 46. 510 U.S. 86 (1993). 
 47. Id. at 97–98. 
 48. Id. at 97 (quoting Steven H. Goldberg & Melvin S. Altman, The Case for the 
Nonapplication of ERISA to Insurers’ General Account Assets, TORT & INS. L.J. 475, 477 
(1986)). 
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“‘solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and . . . for 
the exclusive purpose of . . . providing benefits to participants and their 
beneficiaries.’”49  Following the rationale of Metropolitan Life and 
Holliday, the Court could have held that the state law preempted 
ERISA’s fiduciary obligation because the law fell within the scope of 
ERISA’s saving clause and because it did not run afoul of ERISA’s 
deemer clause.50 
Instead, the Court held that ERISA envisioned a dual regulation of the 
business of insurance by states and the federal government through 
ERISA’s statutory provisions.51  The Court asserted that, in this zone of 
dual regulation, normal rules of federal preemption apply such that 
federal regulations will preempt state regulations when the state “law 
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress. . . .”52  To support this conclusion, the Court 
relied upon language from the district court’s opinion, asserting that “we 
discern no solid basis for believing that Congress, when it designed 
ERISA, intended fundamentally to alter traditional preemption analysis.”53 
Therefore, finding a conflict between the state law regulation of an 
insurer’s general account funds and ERISA’s fiduciary obligations 
regarding such accounts, the Court held that ERISA’s fiduciary 
obligations preempted the state regulations, and that these fiduciary 
obligations were applicable to issues involving John Hancock’s 
management of the general account.54 
Although at first blush Harris Trust appears to be a straightforward 
application of the Supremacy Clause, a more exacting analysis shows 
that the Court made a mistake when it concluded that there was no 
evidence that Congress had an intent “to alter traditional preemption 
analysis.”55  Justice Ginsburg, the author of the majority opinion in 
Harris Trust, did not do a very thorough analysis of Congress’ intent 
regarding the legal effects of a conflict between a saving clause-
protected state law and one of ERISA’s statutory provisions.  For 
example, instead of relying upon a plain meaning statutory interpretation 
and the canons of statutory construction that are supportive of such an 
 
 49. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)). 
 50. See supra text accompanying notes 29–40. 
 51. Harris Trust, 510 U.S. at 98. 
 52. Id. at 99 (citation omitted). 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id. at 101. 
 55. Id. at 99. 
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interpretation, Justice Ginsburg applied an opposing rule: “To answer that 
question, we examine first the language of the governing statute, guided 
not by ‘a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look[ing] to the 
provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.’”56  Curiously, 
this quote is from Pilot Life, wherein the Court, instead of specifically 
examining ERISA’s saving clause’s and preemption clause’s statutory 
language, analyzed ERISA’s legislative scheme and the alleged purpose 
of § 1132(a).  The Pilot Life Court concluded that a broad interpretation 
of the saving clause (to save Mississippi’s bad faith law from 
preemption) would be inconsistent with the goal of § 1132(a) providing 
the exclusive remedies for violations within the scope of § 1132(a), 
including claims against an ERISA plan for alleged improper processing 
of requests for benefits.57 
But, in relying upon Pilot Life’s dictum regarding the exclusivity of § 
1132(a), Justice Ginsburg jumped the gun too quickly.58  She went too 
rapidly to a reconciliation of the various purposes of ERISA’s saving 
clause, of the MFA, and of field preemption.59  Before beginning her 
analysis of ERISA’s statutory purposes, Justice Ginsburg should have 
paid closer attention to ERISA’s statutory language and to several rules 
of statutory interpretation that were in existence when the Court decided 
 
 56. Id. at 94–95 (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987))  
(alteration in original).  Although other court cases, in addition to reviewing the explicit 
language of a preemption clause, have examined the “‘structure and purpose of the 
statute as a whole,’ as revealed not only in the text, but through the reviewing court’s 
reasoned understanding of the way in which Congress intended the statute and its 
surrounding regulatory scheme to affect business, consumers, and the law,” Medtronic, 
Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 486 (1996) (quoting Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. 
Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992)), such an analysis, even when used to achieve a result that 
is different from the plain meaning interpretation as discussed in this Article, will not 
resolve the issue of whether Congress intended that a saving clause-protected law can 
preempt § 1132(a) of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions.  This is because neither 
ERISA’s legislative history, nor anything else that Congress has said about the scope of 
§ 1132(a), or about ERISA’s preemption clause and saving clause, even remotely 
warrants the conclusion that Congress intended that § 1132(a) preempt a saving clause-
protected law.  Furthermore, to the extent that the Court is committed to the rule that 
there must be a “clear and manifest” showing that Congress intended to preempt a state 
law “historic police powers” regulation, Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 471, then the Court 
should be more willing to apply a plain meaning interpretation of ERISA’s preemption 
clause and saving clause because neither ERISA’s statutory language nor its legislative 
history shows that Congress had a “clear and manifest” intent that § 1132(a) preempts a 
state law insurance regulation that provides for remedies that are different from those 
contained in § 1132(a).  Rather, given the clear plain meaning language of the 
preemption clause and saving clause, the only logical conclusion is that Congress clearly 
and manifestly intended that a saving clause-protected state law preempt § 1132(a), even 
when such a law provides different remedies. 
 57. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52–57 (1987). 
 58. Harris Trust, 510 U.S. at 94–95. 
 59. See id. at 97–101. 
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Harris Trust.  These rules of construction are: (1) “‘[t]he question 
whether a certain state action is pre-empted by federal law is one of 
congressional intent’”;60 (2) “‘[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate 
touchstone’”61 of statutory interpretation; (3) the unambiguous text of a 
statute is the primary source from which the Court will garner 
Congressional intent because “vague notions of a statute’s ‘basic 
purpose’ are nonetheless inadequate to overcome the words of its text 
regarding the specific issue under consideration”;62 and (4) when 
interpreting the language of an express preemption clause and an express 
saving clause, the Court “need not go beyond that language to determine 
whether Congress intended” that state law be preempted.63 
 
 60. Gade, 505 U.S. at 96 (1992) (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 
202, 208 (1985)). 
 61. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 
516 (1992)). 
 62. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 261 (1993). 
 63. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 484.  In Medtronic, the Court stated: 
[W]e are presented with the task of interpreting a statutory provision that 
expressly pre-empts state law.  While the pre-emptive language of § 360k(a) 
means that we need not go beyond that language to determine whether 
Congress intended the MDA [Medical Device Amendment] to pre-empt at 
least some state law, we must nonetheless “identify the domain expressly pre-
empted” by the language. 
Id. (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517). 
It should also be noted that the Court also stated: 
Congress’ intent, of course, primarily is discerned from the language of the 
pre-emption statute and the “statutory framework” surrounding it.  [Gade, 505 
U.S. at 111 (Kennedy, J., concurring)]. Also relevant, however, is the “structure and 
purpose of the statute as a whole,” as revealed not only in the text, but through 
the reviewing court’s reasoned understanding of the way in which Congress 
intended the statute and its surrounding regulatory scheme to affect business, 
consumers, and the law. 
Id. at 486 (quoting Gade, 505 U.S. at 98).  The only way that the Court can justify a 
refusal to use a plain meaning interpretation of ERISA’s preemption clause and saving 
clause is to somehow rely upon this statement from Medtronic to allege that allowing a 
saving clause-protected state law to provide an alternative cause of action and remedies 
would be inconsistent with the “statutory framework” underlying § 1132(a)’s civil 
enforcement remedies.  Id.  This seems to be the legal import of the Pilot Life Court’s 
inference that § 1132(a) prohibits a state from offering remedies that are different than 
those provided in § 1132(a).  Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987).  
But, such a rationale is not persuasive because it undermines states’ abilities to regulate 
insurance and because it cuts against the Court’s own canon of interpretation that 
Congress is presumed to intend the interpretation that stems from a statute’s plain 
language.  Cf. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (regarding the 
interpretation of a statute that did not involve a saving clause, the Court stated that “[t]he 
first step ‘is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous 
meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case’”) (quoting Robinson v. Shell 
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Given these rules of statutory interpretation, the Harris Trust Court  
should have first determined whether the language of ERISA’s 
preemption clause and saving clause is unambiguous.  The Court’s 
failure to perform such an evaluation is even more questionable given 
subsequent cases that the Court has decided.  For example, in Circuit 
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,64 a post Harris Trust decision, the Court 
recently reaffirmed that, when the statutory text is clear, there is no need 
to refer to, or rely upon, legislative history when interpreting a statute.65  
Consistently, in Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co.,66 the Court stated: “We 
have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature 
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.  
When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is 
also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’”67 
These rules of construction for unambiguous statutes are applicable to 
an interpretation of ERISA’s saving clause, ERISA’s preemption clause, 
and to an inquiry regarding a saving clause-protected state law’s ability 
to preempt § 1132(a) of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions.  In the 
final analysis, because of the Harris Trust Court’s failure to conduct a 
thorough analysis of the language of ERISA’s preemption clause and 
saving clause, and to follow its own rules of statutory interpretation, 
Harris Trust should have little or no precedential value on whether a 
saving clause-protected state law can preempt § 1132(a) of ERISA’s 
civil enforcement provisions. 
In asserting that the Court should apply a plain meaning interpretation 
of ERISA’s saving clause and ERISA’s preemption clause to determine 
the supremacy of a saving clause-protected state law, this Author does 
 
Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)). 
 64. 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
 65. Id. at 119 (“As the conclusion we reach today is directed by the text of § 1, we 
need not assess the legislative history of the exclusion provision.”). 
 66. 534 U.S. 438 (2002). 
 67. Id. at 461–62 (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992)).  
Some might argue that courts should not apply a plain meaning interpretation of an 
unambiguous statute when the statute “contain[s] conflicting provisions.”  Id. at 461.  To 
support such an argument, one might further state that ERISA’s saving clause itself (or a 
saving clause-protected state law that imposes remedies different from those stated in § 
1132(a)) conflicts with § 1132(a).  And, therefore, courts should not limit themselves 
only to a review of the language of ERISA’s preemption clause and saving clause.  
However, such arguments have no merit because a saving clause-protected state law, 
even if it imposes remedies that are different from § 1132(a)’s remedies, does not 
conflict with § 1132(a) because § 1132(a) does not apply when a state law falls within 
the scope of ERISA’s saving clause.  In such cases, § 1132(a) does not apply because the 
controlling law is the exempted saving clause-protected state law.  Therefore, courts 
should continue to apply a plain meaning interpretation of ERISA’s preemption clause 
and saving clause at least when determining the nature of the state laws that ERISA’s 
saving clause exempts from preemption. 
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not mean to imply that the Court should never disregard a plain meaning 
interpretation of a saving clause and a preemption clause.  However, to 
do so, at a minimum the Court should justify such action by showing 
that the plain meaning language of either a preemption clause or a saving 
clause clearly conflicts with another statutory provision (or with clear 
and undisputable legislative history) that conclusively shows that 
Congress’ intent is different than that expressed in the plain meaning 
language.  Using other statutory provisions and legislative history to 
disregard the plain meaning language of a preemption clause and saving 
clause arguably is one of the rationales that underlie the Court’s prior 
observations that the Court will sometimes go beyond the language of a 
statute, including a preemption clause and a saving clause, and look at 
the “‘structure and purpose of the statute as a whole,’ as revealed not only in 
the text, but through the reviewing court’s reasoned understanding of the 
way in which Congress intended the statute and its surrounding 
regulatory scheme to affect business, consumers, and the law.”68 
However, even when one acknowledges that sometimes it is permissible 
for the Court to go beyond a plain meaning interpretation and look at the 
“structure and purpose of the statute as a whole,” such an approach will 
not resolve the issue whether a saving clause-protected state law can 
preempt § 1132(a) of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions.69  This is 
because neither § 1132(a), nor any of ERISA’s scant legislative history, 
clearly and manifestly shows that Congress intended that § 1132(a) 
preempt a saving clause-protected state law.  Rather, given that Congress 
apparently drafted ERISA’s saving clause to ensure that states have the 
authority to regulate insurance, as provided for in the MFA, the best 
conclusion is that a state insurance regulation, even when it provides 
different remedies than those provided in § 1132(a), presumptively trumps 
§ 1132(a).  This is especially true given that both ERISA’s preemption clause 
and ERISA’s saving clause more clearly provide for a saving clause 
protected state law’s preemption of § 1132(a) than do other statutory 
provisions of ERISA, or any legislative history references, provide for § 
1132(a)’s preemption of a saving clause-protected state law. 
 
 68. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 486 (quoting Gade, 505 U.S. at 98). 
 69. Id. 
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IV.  THE COURT SHOULD APPLY A PLAIN MEANING INTERPRETATION 
OF ERISA’S PREEMPTION AND SAVING CLAUSES 
The Court in Harris Trust, being aware that it had previously stated in 
other opinions that it would interpret a statute according to its clear and 
unambiguous language, should have either followed a plain meaning 
statutory interpretation,70 or it should have given some reasonable 
explanation for not doing so.  Instead, the majority opinion, in adopting 
the lower court’s assertion, simply stated: “In accord with the District 
Court in this case, however, we discern no solid basis for believing that 
Congress, when it designed ERISA, intended fundamentally to alter 
traditional preemption analysis.”71 
Such an assertion is inadequate and unjustified because ERISA’s 
preemption clause clearly and unambiguously shows that Congress did 
intend to change “traditional preemption analysis.”72  ERISA’s preemption 
clause clearly provides: 
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this 
subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State 
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan 
described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) 
of this title.73 
An honest plain meaning deconstruction of the preemption clause is 
instructive regarding its scope.  The “first phrase” of ERISA’s preemption 
clause—“[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b) of this section”—is an 
exception to the “second phrase”—“the provisions of this subchapter 
and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws 
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefits 
plan . . . .”74  The second phrase is the operative language of ERISA’s 
preemption clause.  The first phrase refers to ERISA’s saving clause, 
contained in subsection (b).  When one reads the second phrase and the 
first phrase together, these phrases provide that ERISA’s preemption 
clause will preempt any state law that “relate[s] to” an ERISA plan 
unless ERISA’s saving clause saves the state law from preemption.75  
Furthermore, the only limitation on the saving clause is ERISA’s deemer 
 
 70. Instead of examining the specific language of ERISA’s preemption clause and 
saving clause, the Harris Trust Court engaged in an analysis of the Supremacy Clause’s 
impact when a saving clause-protected state law has provisions that are different than 
one of ERISA’s substantive provisions.  See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris 
Trust & Savs. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 97–101 (1993). 
 71. Id. at 99 (citation omitted). 
 72. Id. 
 73. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000). 
 74. Id. (emphasis added). 
 75. Id. 
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clause, which prevents state laws from deeming ERISA plans to be 
insurance companies for the purpose of regulating them under ERISA’s 
saving clause.76 
A further deconstruction of ERISA’s preemption clause’s language 
shows that a saving clause-protected state law escapes ERISA’s 
preemption even when the state law conflicts with one of ERISA’s 
substantive provisions.  For example, when the preemption clause’s 
language speaks of preemption of state laws, it does so regarding certain 
“provisions of this subchapter” superseding state laws.77  Importantly, 
the “provisions of this subchapter” language refers to Subchapter I of 
ERISA, which includes ERISA’s “fiduciary responsibility” provisions in 
§§ 1101–1114 and ERISA’s “administration and enforcement” 
provisions in §§ 1131–1147, which includes § 1132(a) of ERISA’s civil 
enforcement provisions.78 
When the second phrase of ERISA’s preemption clause is read in 
conjunction with the first phrase, the meaning of ERISA’s preemption 
clause is that certain sections of ERISA will preempt state laws except 
when such state laws regulate insurance under ERISA’s saving clause.79  
More specifically, it means that ERISA’s fiduciary provisions (as at 
issue in Harris Trust) and ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions (such 
as § 1132(a)) will preempt state laws except when such state laws 
regulate insurance within the scope of  ERISA’s saving clause.  It should 
 
 76. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2000).  See Metro. Life Ins. v. Massachusetts, 471 
U.S. 724, 746 (1985) (“We therefore decline to impose any limitation on the saving 
clause beyond those Congress imposed in the clause itself and in the ‘deemer clause’ 
which modifies it.”); see also FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990) (stating 
that the only way a state law can be excluded from the saving clause is by the deemer 
clause).  ERISA’s deemer clause is an exception to the saving clause, in that the saving 
clause does not apply if the deemer clause is applicable.  Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 733.  
The Court has interpreted the deemer clause to mean that, pursuant to ERISA’s saving 
clause, states can regulate the “business of insurance,” except that states cannot deem an 
ERISA plan itself “to be an insurance company or other insurer . . . or to be engaged in 
the business of insurance . . . for the purpose of any State law purporting to regulate 
insurance companies . . . .”  Id.  In other words, when the deemer clause is interpreted 
consistently with the saving clause, states can regulate insurance companies that supply 
insurance policies to ERISA plans, including the terms of those insurance policies and 
the other incidents of the “business of insurance,” but states cannot either directly 
regulate ERISA plans themselves, or regulate self-funded ERISA plans.  See id. 
 77. See supra text accompanying note 73. 
 78. For a review of the ERISA statutory provisions that are contained within this 
subchapter, which is subchapter I of ERISA, see the table of contents that precedes 
ERISA’s statutory provisions.  29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2000). 
 79. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). 
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be clearly noted that because ERISA’s preemption clause is an express 
preemption clause, express preemption applies, instead of conflict 
preemption or field preemption.80  In other words, the statutory language 
of ERISA’s express preemption clause is outcome determinant, pursuant 
to the Court’s own rules of statutory construction: “We [the Court] have 
stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in 
a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.  When 
the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the 
last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’”81 
Given the Court’s own canon of statutory interpretation, one can make 
a cogent argument that the Court erroneously decided Harris Trust.  This 
is because ERISA’s preemption clause, being an express preemption 
clause, expressly provides that ERISA’s fiduciary standards (being one 
of “the provisions of this subchapter”) do not supersede or preempt a 
state law regulation of insurance, such as the law at issue in Harris 
Trust.82 
This same general conclusion applies to Pilot Life’s speculation that § 
1132(a) would preempt an inconsistent state law insurance regulation.  
In other words, § 1132(a) does not preempt a state law regulation that 
satisfies the saving clause test because ERISA’s express preemption 
clause provides that the civil enforcement provisions (being one of the 
“provisions of this subchapter”) do not supersede or preempt a state law 
that falls within the scope of ERISA’s saving clause.83 
Fortunately, in most of its ERISA preemption cases, the Court has not 
confronted a situation where an argument is made that a specific section 
of ERISA, such as § 1132(a), preempts a state law that regulates 
insurance under the saving clause’s protection.84  The main thrust in 
many of the Court’s prior cases is that the relevant state law, despite not 
conflicting with one of ERISA’s substantive provisions, stands as an 
obstacle to ERISA’s preemption clause’s purpose of providing for a 
 
 80. The Harris Trust Court erroneously reasoned that field preemption applies 
when a saving clause-protected state law conflicts with one of ERISA’s substantive 
provisions.  John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 
99 (1993) (asserting that “‘where [that] law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,’ federal preemption occurs”) (quoting 
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984) (alteration in original)).  
Instead of field preemption, express preemption principles apply when there is an 
express preemption clause.  Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484 (1996) (citation 
omitted). 
 81. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 461–62 (2002) (quoting Conn. 
Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992)). 
 82. See supra text accompanying note 73. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 377 (2002). 
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uniformity of regulation of ERISA welfare benefit plans.85  In some of 
those cases, the Court has held that a state law that has the potential of 
creating disuniformity “relates to” an ERISA plan and is therefore 
preempted unless ERISA’s saving clause exempts the law from 
preemption.86  But, now the real divide for ERISA’s saving clause 
jurisprudence is whether the Court will interpret ERISA’s saving clause 
such that a saving clause-protected state law will actually preempt a 
conflicting ERISA statutory provision.  The main theme of this Article is 
that ERISA’s preemption clause’s language, as analyzed above, establishes 
that a saving clause-protected state law does preempt inconsistent 
ERISA statutory provisions contained in subchapter I, including ERISA’s 
fiduciary provisions and § 1132(a) of ERISA’s civil enforcement 
provisions. 
However, in its last pronouncement on the issue of § 1132(a)’s 
preemptive effects, in Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran,87 the Court 
stated its support for Pilot Life’s reference that § 1132(a) preempts a 
state law that is within the scope of ERISA’s saving clause if the law 
creates “alternative causes of action and alternative remedies.”88  But, 
because the Court’s decision in Rush did not involve a conflict between 
§ 1132(a) and a saving clause-protected state law, Rush’s discussion is 
mere dictum.89  That dictum provides: 
   
 
 85. See generally Pittman, supra note 1, at 237–68 (discussing cases that interpret 
ERISA’s preemption clause); Pittman, supra note 12, at 393 (same). 
 86. See Pittman, supra note 1, at 246–48. 
 87. 536 U.S. 355 (2002). 
 88. Id. at 381. 
 89. See id. at 386 (holding that the binding independent review law “imposes no 
new obligation or remedy like the causes of action considered in Russell, Pilot Life, and 
Ingersoll-Rand”). 
Having tacitly accepted Pilot Life’s dicta, and concluded that the state law fell within 
the scope of ERISA’s saving clause, see id. at 375, the Rush Court reasoned that there 
was no conflict with § 1132(a) because the relevant binding independent review 
provision of the state law did not create either an alternative cause of action or an 
alternative remedy to those provided in § 1132(a).  See id. at 386.  The Court reached 
this conclusion despite the fact that the state law made the independent reviewer’s 
decision binding on the HMO.  See id. at 379–80.  Apparently, in the Court’s opinion, 
the reason why the law did not create an alternative cause of action or alternative remedy 
is that a beneficiary, complaining about denied benefits, would still have to file a civil 
enforcement claim under § 1132(a)’s civil enforcement provisions, and that beneficiary 
would still be seeking only denied benefits, which is the only monetary remedy 
allowable under § 1132(a), and not compensatory or punitive damages. 
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 Although we have yet to encounter a forced choice between the congressional 
policies of exclusively federal remedies and the “reservation of the business of 
insurance to the States,” [Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 
744 n.21 (1985)], we have anticipated such a conflict, with the state insurance 
regulation losing out if it allows plan participants “to obtain remedies . . . that 
Congress rejected in ERISA.”90 
Several observations about the above-quoted statement, which shows 
that the Court is leaning toward a definitive holding that § 1132(a) 
would trump a saving clause-protected state law, are instructive.  First, 
to support its dictum, the Court relied upon three of its prior cases.  
However, the Court correctly noted that these three cases did not involve 
a direct conflict between ERISA’s statutory provisions and a saving 
clause-protected state law.91  For example, in Massachusetts Mutual Life 
Insurance Co. v. Russell,92 the Court simply referred to the extensiveness 
of § 1132(a)’s civil enforcement provisions as evidence that the Court 
should not imply a private right of action under ERISA for compensatory 
and punitive damages.93  That case did not involve a saving clause-protected 
state law; as such, Russell is really not applicable to a situation where 
there is a conflict between § 1132(a) and a saving clause-protected state 
law.  Unless, of course, one wants to incorporate Russell’s broad statements 
about § 1132(a)’s exclusiveness into an analysis involving such a 
conflict, instead of applying the clear and unambiguous language of 
ERISA’s preemption clause and saving clause, which provides that the 
deemer clause is the only limitation on the scope of ERISA’s saving 
clause.94 
The thrust of this Article is that Russell should not be forced into an 
analysis involving such a conflict because the Russell Court’s comments 
about the exclusiveness of § 1132(a)’s remedies are nothing more than 
the Court’s own policy arguments regarding Congress’ intent with 
respect to the scope of permissible remedies under an ERISA plan.  Such 
policy arguments circumvent and cut against the Court’s own canon of 
statutory interpretation that “[w]hen the words of a statute are unambiguous, 
then, this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’”95  
Given that canon of interpretation, and the fact that ERISA’s preemption 
clause’s language, in a plain meaning fashion, clearly and unambiguously 
states that ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions (such as § 1132(a)) do 
 
 90. Id. at 377 (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987)). 
 91. See id. (citing Metro. Life Ins. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 744 n.21 (1985); 
Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54). 
 92. 473 U.S. 134 (1985). 
 93. Id. at 147–48. 
 94. See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 73–79. 
 95. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 462 (2002) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992)). 
PITTMAN.DOC 9/10/2019  3:30 PM 
[VOL. 41:  593, 2004]  ERISA’s Civil Enforcement Provisions 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 617 
not preempt a saving clause-protected state law, the logical conclusion is 
that, despite Russell’s conclusions regarding the extensiveness of § 
1132(a), a saving clause-protected state law can preempt § 1132(a) by 
imposing different remedies, including compensatory and punitive 
damages.  Furthermore, another one of the Court’s cases, Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor,96  which contains language regarding the 
exclusiveness of § 1132(a)’s remedies, does not destroy that conclusion. 
In Taylor, the Court held that a beneficiary’s claim for an alleged 
improper denial of disability benefits was removable to federal court 
because § 1132(a) provides a cause of action for the same alleged 
improper denial of benefits.97  However, the Taylor Court recognized 
that the claim did not involve a saving clause-protected state law.98  
Thus, there was no conflict between § 1132(a) and a saving clause-
protected state law.  Therefore, Taylor, which is a case about complete 
preemption for removal jurisdiction purposes, is not relevant when a 
saving clause-protected state law conflicts with § 1132(a).99   
Likewise, the Court’s decision in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon100 
did not involve a saving clause-protected state law’s direct conflict with 
§ 1132(a).  Rather, the parties did not even raise the saving clause as an 
issue because the state law claim did not fall within the saving clause’s 
scope.101  Instead, Ingersoll-Rand is a simple conflict preemption case 
where ERISA’s preemption clause preempted an employee’s claim for 
compensatory and punitive damages because the claim was “related to” 
the ERISA plan given that it was “specifically designed to affect 
employee benefit plans” and that the existence of the plan was the 
essence of the plaintiff’s claim.102 
 
 96. 481 U.S. 58 (1987). 
 97. Id. at 66–67. 
 98. See id. (avoiding a discussion that ERISA’s saving clause was applicable to the 
facts before the Court). 
 99. See id. at 66–67. 
 100. 498 U.S. 133 (1990). 
 101. See id. at 140–41. 
 102. Id. at 140.  The employee’s claim was premised upon an employer’s alleged 
termination of the employee to avoid paying pension benefits to the employee.  Id. at 
135–36.  In effect, the Court applied the “reference to” prong of the two-part definition 
of “relate to.”  The Court stated: 
   [W]e have virtually taken it for granted that state laws which are 
“specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans” are pre-empted under 
§ 514 (a) [ERISA’s preemption clause]. . . .  The Texas cause of action makes 
specific reference to, and indeed is premised on, the existence of a pension 
plan.  In the words of the Texas court, the cause of action “allows recovery 
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But, despite the fact that neither Russell, Taylor, nor Ingersoll-Rand 
involves a direct conflict between § 1132(a) and a state law protected by 
the saving clause, the Court has used statements and holdings from these 
cases to imply that, when such a conflict does exist, § 1132(a) will 
preempt an inconsistent state law.  For example, in Rush, the Court 
broadly interpreted Ingersoll-Rand to conclude that § 1132(a)’s purposes 
and policies preempt any state law or lawsuit that provides remedies that 
are different than those provided in § 1132(a).103  However, that 
interpretation overlooks the fact that, in Ingersoll-Rand, the Court was 
not faced with a direct conflict between § 1132(a) and a state law that is 
within the scope of ERISA’s saving clause.104  Therefore, Ingersoll-
Rand’s conflict preemption discussion, and other general comments 
about § 1132(a)’s purposes and policies, are not dispositive.  Instead, the 
decisive fact is that, unlike in Ingersoll-Rand, the language in both 
ERISA’s saving clause and preemption clause establishes that Congress’  
intent is that § 1132(a) does not preempt a state law that falls within the 
scope of ERISA’s saving clause.105 
Furthermore, the legislative history that the Court has previously 
relied upon to assert that ERISA’s civil enforcement remedies are 
exclusive, is not dispositive.  In Taylor, the Court relied upon a portion 
of ERISA’s legislative history that provides: “All such actions [for 
 
when the plaintiff proves that the principal reason for his termination was the 
employer’s desire to avoid contributing to or paying benefits under the 
employee’s pension fund. . . .  Because the court’s inquiry must be directed to 
the plan, this judicially created cause of action “relate[s] to” an ERISA plan. 
Id. at 140 (emphasis added) (alterations in original). 
 103. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 379 (2002).  However, the 
Court’s reliance upon Ingersoll-Rand is misplaced because the state law at issue was not 
a state insurance regulation under ERISA’s saving clause; the only issue was whether 
ERISA’s preemption clause preempted the state law claim because it related to an 
ERISA plan.  Despite this conclusion, the Court in Rush somehow tried to use Ingersoll-
Rand as precedent that state laws which provide additional remedies are preempted 
under Pilot Life’s dicta that § 1132(a) provides the only remedies for enforcement of 
rights protected under ERISA.  However, it should be noted that the Pilot Life Court 
stated its dicta while it was discussing whether ERISA’s saving clause exempted 
Mississippi’s bad faith law from preemption.  Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 
41, 51–57 (1987).  Therefore, a case like Ingersoll-Rand, which does not involve 
ERISA’s saving clause, should not be used to support an argument that § 1132(a) 
preempts a saving clause-protected state law.  As such, the Rush Court’s reliance upon 
Ingersoll-Rand is misplaced because different considerations are involved when 
determining whether ERISA’s preemption clause preempts a state law (as at issue in 
Ingersoll-Rand) than when determining whether ERISA’s saving clause exempts a state 
law from preemption, as is at issue when one considers whether a saving clause-
protected state law preempts § 1132(a).  Therefore, the Rush Court’s attempt to use 
Ingersoll-Rand to support its speculation about whether § 1132(a) would preempt a 
saving clause-protected law is tantamount to mixing apples and oranges. 
 104. See Rush Prudential HMO, 536 U.S. at 377. 
 105. See supra text accompanying notes 73–79. 
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denied benefits or for enforcement of rights to benefits] in Federal or 
State courts are to be regarded as arising under the laws of the United 
States in similar fashion to those brought under section 301 of the 
Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA).”106  However, this 
statement cannot be taken literally.  First, given the presence of ERISA’s 
saving clause, the most logical conclusion is that the statement about 
section 301 is relevant only to a situation where the saving clause is 
inapplicable.107  That is, by enacting a saving clause that exempts certain 
state laws from ERISA’s preemption, Congress did not intend that 
saving clause-protected laws “aris[e] under the laws of the United 
States.”108  Instead, saving clause-protected laws are in furtherance of 
Congress’ intent that states’ regulation of insurance shall control.109  No 
one can seriously argue that a state law regulation that falls within the 
saving clause’s scope arises under federal law.  Such laws arise under 
state law; therefore, ERISA’s legislative history comments about section 
301 are irrelevant.110 
A few more words are in order regarding other portions of ERISA’s 
 
 106. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65–66 (1987) (quoting H.R. CONF. 
REP. NO. 93-1280, at 327 (1974)). 
 107. The fact that the legislative history reference to section 301 is not applicable to 
a saving clause-protected state law is shown by the clear language of ERISA’s 
preemption clause which provides that ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions shall not 
supersede or preempt a state law within the scope of ERISA’s saving clause.  See supra 
notes 73–79.  The irrelevancy of section 301 is especially shown if the Court’s canon of 
interpretation—“when the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, the first canon is 
also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete’”—is applied.  Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 
U.S. 438, 462 (2002) (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992)).  
 108. See text accompanying supra note 106.  It seems only logical that saving 
clause-protected laws, which states primarily enact under their insurance codes, arise 
under state law.  Therefore, there is no need for exclusive federal jurisdiction over a 
lawsuit based upon such laws.  Rather, state courts should have at least concurrent 
jurisdiction to interpret state insurance regulations and to resolve lawsuits premised upon 
such insurance regulations. 
 109. See supra text accompanying notes 73–79.  Therefore, the best conclusion is 
that there should never be a complete preemption (for removal of a state lawsuit to 
federal court as implied by ERISA’s legislative history references to section 301 of the 
LMRA) of a state lawsuit that is premised upon a state law that is within the scope of 
ERISA’s saving clause. 
Likewise, a saving clause-protected state law should escape substantive preemption 
under ERISA’s preemption clause.  Nonpreemption is the clear import of the language 
that Congress codified in ERISA’s preemption clause and in its saving clause.  See id. 
 110. That a saving clause-protected law arises under state law is further supported 
by ERISA’s preemption clause’s language which provides that ERISA’s civil 
enforcement provisions, including § 1132(a), should not preempt a state law that falls 
within the scope of ERISA’s saving clause.  29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).   
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legislative history that the Court has used to support its apparent belief 
that § 1132(a) has preemptive effects over a saving clause-protected 
state law.  In addition to the Court’s improper reliance upon section 301, 
the Court has identified at least three more principles that it has garnered 
from its review of ERISA’s legislative history: (1) there is a need for 
uniformity of regulation of ERISA remedies; (2) there is a need for 
ERISA “administrators [to be able to] predict the legality of proposed 
actions without the necessity of reference to varying state laws”;111 and (3) 
“[t]he expectations that a federal common law of rights and obligations 
under ERISA-regulated plans would develop . . . would make little sense if 
the remedies available to ERISA participants and beneficiaries under [§ 
1132(a)] could be supplemented or supplanted by varying state laws.”112  
Despite the Court’s reliance upon these statements, such justifications do 
not offer a persuasive reason for the Court’s apparent belief that § 1132(a) 
preempts a saving clause-protected state law that offers remedies that are 
different than the ones contained in § 1132(a). 
First, the goal of uniform regulations, and of ERISA’s administrators’ 
ability to predict the parameters of applicable regulations, is already 
restricted by the mere presence of ERISA’s saving clause, which 
evidences Congress’ intent that ERISA benefit plans be subject to 
varying regulations if different states enact inconsistent laws to govern 
insurance companies, HMOs, and other entities that fall within the scope 
of ERISA’s saving clause.  Second, the belief that courts will develop 
federal common law is not hampered by states’ enactment of saving 
clause-protected laws granting remedies that are different than the 
remedies of § 1132(a).  In other words, courts will still be able to 
develop common law when either there is no relevant saving clause-
protected state law, or when ERISA’s saving clause is not applicable, as 
with self-insured ERISA plans.113 
Therefore, given the presence of ERISA’s saving clause, which gives 
states the authority to regulate insurance, the Court should be extremely 
careful when it relies upon legislative history references regarding 
uniformity and the development of common law.  This is especially true 
because giving too much weight to such references might impermissibly 
undercut the policies that underlie Congress’ intent regarding the scope 
of ERISA’s saving clause. 
 
 111. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987) (quoting 120 Cong. 
Rec. 29933 (1974)). 
 112. Id. at 56. 
 113. Because of the deemer clause, states cannot use ERISA’s saving clause to 
regulate self-insured ERISA plans.  See supra note 76 and accompanying text.  Therefore, 
state law remedies are not applicable to self-insured plans, and courts will be free to 
develop common law to regulate  such plans. 
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V.  THE COURT’S UNREASONABLE CONCERN ABOUT “ERISA 
DESTROYING ITSELF” 
Pursuant to the above discussion, there is no definitive reason why the 
Court and lower-level federal courts should not enforce ERISA’s saving 
clause to the fullest extent of its plain meaning language.  If this means 
that ERISA’s saving clause will destroy certain portions of ERISA’s 
civil enforcement provisions, then such destruction would be a necessary 
consequence of Congress’ codification of a broad saving clause and a 
broad preemption clause in the same statute.  Therefore, to respect 
Congress’ intent, the Court should avoid using judicial activism, in the 
guise of statutory interpretation, to prevent the alleged destruction of 
ERISA.114 
However, it is doubtful that the Court will be able to resist the urge to 
judicially legislate its own beliefs about the proper reconciliation of a 
conflict between § 1132(a) and a saving clause-protected state law.  But, 
the cases that the Court has relied upon to support its belief about that 
reconciliation are distinguishable.  For example, in American Telephone 
& Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc.,115 the Court held that 
the “filed rate doctrine,” under the Communication Act of 1934, 
preempted both respondent’s state law breach of contract claim and state 
law tortious interference with contract claim,116 and that the saving 
clause of the Communication Act did not exempt the claims from 
preemption.117  The Communication Act’s saving clause provided: 
“Nothing in this chapter contained shall in any way abridge or alter the 
remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions 
of this chapter are in addition to such remedies.”118  The Court held that 
the saving clause did not save the state law claims from preemption 
because those claims were “‘absolutely inconsistent with the provisions 
of the act,’” and therefore “‘the act cannot be held to destroy itself.’”119 
 
 114. The Court has recognized that any disuniformity of regulation from an 
application of ERISA’s saving clause is due to Congress’ putting the saving clause in the 
same statute that also has a broad preemption clause.  Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. 
Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 381 (asserting that “[s]uch disuniformities . . . are the inevitable 
result of the congressional decision to ‘save’ local insurance regulation”) (quoting Metro. 
Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985)) (alteration in original). 
 115. 524 U.S. 214 (1998). 
 116. Id. at 226–27. 
 117. Id. at 227–28. 
 118. 47 U.S.C. § 414 (2000). 
 119. AT&T, 524 U.S. at 228 (quoting Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil 
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Similarly, in Adams Express Co. v. Croninger,120 the Court held that 
section 20, the Carmack Amendment to the original Interstate Commerce 
Act, preempted a Kentucky state law that would have invalidated a 
carrier’s contract provision which limited the carrier’s liability for 
damaged property.121  The Court found preemption because the Carmack 
Amendment regulated a carrier’s liability to shippers,122 and because 
Congress enacted the amendment to avoid a disuniformity of regulation 
under different state laws.123  Relying upon the supremacy of federal 
regulation of interstate commerce, the Court held that the Carmack 
Amendment must preempt the inconsistent Kentucky state law.124 
The Court rejected the shipper’s claim that a saving clause to the 
Interstate Commerce Act saved Kentucky’s state law from preemption.125  
That saving clause provides: “Except as otherwise provided in this part, 
the remedies provided under this part are in addition to remedies existing 
under another law or common law.”126  The Court held that the saving 
clause could not save the Kentucky law because “[i]t would result in the 
nullification of the regulation of a national subject and operate to 
maintain the confusion of the diverse regulation which it was the 
purpose of Congress to put an end to.”127  The Court asserted that the 
saving clause preserves only those state laws that were “‘not inconsistent 
with the rules and regulations prescribed by the provisions of [the] 
act,’”128 and that “‘the act cannot be said to destroy itself.’”129 
Regardless of the correctness of the Court’s decision as applied to the 
specific facts at issue in Central Office Telephone and Croninger, the 
Court’s broad statement about an act not being allowed to destroy itself 
creates an excellent means by which the Court and lower-level courts 
can engage in judicial lawmaking in contravention of Congress’ intent 
regarding the scope of a particular saving clause and its impact on the 
 
Co., 204 U.S. 426, 446 (1907).  In the ERISA context, a saving clause-protected state 
law that allows remedies that are different than those provided for in § 1132(a) would 
not be “absolutely inconsistent with” § 1132(a) because, pursuant to the terms of 
ERISA’s preemption clause, § 1132(a) would not be applicable.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 73–79.  Therefore, there would be no ERISA statutory provision that 
would be in conflict with the saving clause-protected law. 
 120. 226 U.S. 491 (1913). 
 121. See id. at 503–06. 
 122. See id. 
 123. Id. at 506. 
 124. Id. at 507. 
 125. Id. at 507–08. 
 126. Carmack Amendment to Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 13103 (2000). 
 127. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 507 (1913). 
 128. Id. (quoting Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 446 
(1907)). 
 129. Id. (quoting Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. at 446). 
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substantive provisions of a federal law.130  To limit courts’ abilities to 
disregard congressional intent, Central Office Telephone’s and Croninger’s 
statements about a federal statute not being allowed to destroy itself 
must be evaluated in the context of the specific language of a federal 
statute, including the statute’s preemption clause and saving clause.  In 
other words, if the language of a federal statute shows that Congress 
intended that the statute’s saving clause exempt certain state laws from 
preemption even when those state laws might be inconsistent with the 
substantive provisions of the federal law itself, the Court should not, in 
the guise of statutory interpretation, stand in the way of the execution of 
that Congressional intent.131  For example, the plain meaning language 
of ERISA’s saving clause provides that “nothing in this subchapter shall 
be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State 
which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.”132  Given that § 1132(a) 
of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions is one of the provisions in “this 
subchapter,” Congress’ intent, as expressed in both ERISA’s saving 
clause and preemption clause,133 is that § 1132(a) should not preempt a 
state law that regulates insurance.134 
In deference to Congressional intent, the Court should avoid applying 
its own rule of construction that a federal statute “cannot be held to 
destroy itself.”135  Congress’ intent must control.  If Congress, the body 
charged with enacting federal statutes, wants a statute’s saving clause 
(when applicable) to destroy certain portions of a statute, the Court, as 
an interpreter of federal statutes, has no legitimate reason to complain 
about a saving clause destroying a statute.  This is especially true when a 
statute has plain language that clearly shows that a saving clause and a 
preemption clause broadly exempt certain state laws from preemption. 
ERISA’s preemption clause specifically provides that the preemptive 
effects of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions (§ 1132(a)), being a 
 
 130. See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1181 n.10 (3rd 
ed. 2000) (asserting that a court that does not enforce a saving clause as written “is 
illegitimately disregarding the source of its authority and, regardless of where its 
preemption inquiry leads, is pursuing a fundamentally lawless path”). 
 131. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 132. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000) (emphasis added).  The word “any” should 
be emphasized because Congress did not say that only consistent state laws are saved 
from preemption; rather, all state laws that regulate insurance escape ERISA’s preemption. 
 133. See supra text accompanying notes 73–79. 
 134. See id. 
 135. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 507 (1913) (quoting Tex. & 
Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 446 (1907)). 
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provision of “this subchapter,” is limited by ERISA’s saving clause, as 
codified in subsection (b).136  In other words, the preemption clause 
provides that except as provided in subsection (b) (ERISA’s saving 
clause), § 1132(a) and certain other provisions of ERISA shall supersede 
or preempt certain state laws.137  The saving clause, subsection (b), states 
that “nothing in this subchapter (which includes § 1132(a) of ERISA’s 
civil enforcement provisions) shall be construed to exempt or relieve any 
person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or 
securities.”138  Clearly, the language of ERISA’s saving clause and of 
ERISA’s preemption clause is broad enough to exempt from preemption 
a state insurance regulation that offers different remedies than § 1132(a).  
Therefore, to the extent that the Court is an interpreter of laws and not a 
drafter of laws, it should have no problem with adopting the plain 
meaning interpretation that this Article has laid out, especially when one 
considers that Congress can amend ERISA to avoid any alleged 
destruction that might occur when a saving clause-protected state law 
preempts one of ERISA’s substantive provisions.139 
 
 136. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000). 
 137. Id. 
 138. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000) (emphasis added).  See also supra text 
accompanying notes 73–80. 
 139. In non-ERISA contexts, the Court has relied upon Congress’ ability to amend a 
federal statute as a reason for not overruling an erroneously-decided precedent.  See 
Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 362–63 (2000) (“The policy of stare 
decisis is at its most powerful in statutory interpretation (which Congress is always free 
to supersede with new legislation) . . . .”).  Generally, the Author does not believe that a 
future Congress’ ability to amend a federal statute is sufficient grounds for the Court’s 
refusal to overrule an opinion that it has incorrectly decided by misinterpreting a past 
Congress’ intent.  See Larry J. Pittman, The Federal Arbitration Act: The Supreme 
Court’s Erroneous Statutory Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and a Proposal for Change, 
53 ALA. L. REV. 789, 818–19 (2002) (criticizing the position that Congress’ future 
ability to amend a statute should be used as justification for not overruling an 
erroneously-decided statutory precedent).  However, when applying a plain meaning 
interpretation to a federal statute, the Author does believe that a present or future ability 
by Congress to amend a federal statute is an important consideration.  In contrast to a 
situation where the Court upholds one of its erroneously-decided statutory interpretation 
precedents (which the Court allegedly interpreted according to its understanding of the  
enacting Congress’ intent) on the grounds that a future Congress can amend the statute if 
it does not agree with the erroneous interpretation, applying a plain meaning 
interpretation accepts the enacting Congress’ true intent regarding the scope of a statute.  
By accepting the enacting Congress’ original intent, the Court will be true to its prior 
statements that it will interpret a statute as written by Congress.  Mertens v. Hewitt 
Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 261 (1993). 
Furthermore, the Court should not have any qualms about the impact of its plain 
meaning statutory interpretation—even when the Court fears that it should not interpret a 
saving clause in such a manner as to destroy a federal statute’s substantive provisions—
because a future Congress can amend the statute to alleviate any undesirable effects from 
the Court’s plain meaning interpretation.  Such reliance upon a future Congress’ ability 
to amend a statute when it does not like the Court’s plain meaning interpretation is 
supportable because, unlike where the Court attempts to use stare decisis to avoid 
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Of course, the Court can continue in its apparent belief that a saving 
clause should not be allowed to destroy a statute, as the Court’s dictum 
in Rush implies.140  The Court can even locate other cases to support its 
efforts.  For example, in a non-ERISA case, Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ 
Legal Committee,141 the Court stated “that neither an express pre-
emption provision nor a saving clause ‘bar[s] the ordinary working of 
conflict pre-emption principles.’”142  But, the Court should not apply this 
rule of construction such that a saving clause-protected state law will 
never preempt an inconsistent federal statutory provision.  A closer 
examination of the rule shows that, for support, the Buckman Court 
relied upon Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.143  But in doing so, the 
Buckman Court should have recognized that, despite the Geier Court’s 
statement that a saving clause and a preemption clause do not alter 
traditional conflict preemption, the Geier Court acknowledged that 
Congress’ intent is controlling.  For example, the Geier Court stated: 
“Nothing in the language of the saving clause suggests an intent to save 
state-law tort actions that conflict with federal regulations.”144  From 
this quote, it is clear that Congress’ intent, as expressed in the language 
of preemption clauses and saving clauses, is the paramount factor that 
should control the Court’s decision on whether a saving clause will 
exempt an inconsistent state law from preemption, including whether a 
saving clause-protected state law can preempt § 1132(a) of ERISA’s 
civil enforcement provisions. 
Therefore, the Court should not use its own rules of construction to 
 
overruling an erroneously-decided precedent, reliance upon a future Congress’ ability to 
amend a statute to avoid an unwanted plain meaning interpretation (that is a correct 
interpretation) is not an effort to support a Court’s erroneously-decided interpretation 
about a past Congress’ intent.  Instead, it is an effort to defer to the original plain 
meaning congressional intent of a statute with the assurance that a future Congress can 
amend the statute to promote its own beliefs about the future scope of the statute, even 
when the belief is different from the intent of the enacting Congress. 
 140. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 377–78 (2002). 
 141. 531 U.S. 341 (2001). 
 142. Id. at 352 (quoting Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000)) 
(alteration in original).  This statement by the Court seems to be based upon its belief 
that the Supremacy Clause controls when there is a conflict between a state law and a 
federal law even when Congress has shown an intent that the state law should escape 
federal preemption.  As such, this statement appears to be inconsistent with other cases 
by the Court that resolve federal preemption issues by a statutory construction of Congress’ 
intent in favor of or against preemption.  See infra note 175 and accompanying text. 
 143. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).  See also Buckman, 531 U.S. at 352. 
 144. Geier, 529 U.S. at 869 (emphasis added). 
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thwart Congress’ intent, especially given that there is no non-Court 
manufactured authority for the Geier Court’s statement that “this Court 
has repeatedly ‘decline[d] to give broad effect to saving clauses where 
doing so would  upset the careful regulatory scheme established by 
federal law.’”145  One wonders from whom the Court obtained its 
authority to not give broad effect to a saving clause, especially when a 
saving clause’s language would allow a broad exemption from federal 
preemption. 
Judge Richard A. Posner’s comments are possibly instructive.  “The 
Supreme Court is a political court.  The discretion that the justices exercise 
can fairly be described as legislative in character, but the conditions 
under which this ‘legislature’ operates are different from those of 
Congress.”146  Unless the Court wants to be a superlegislature, is there 
any legitimate reason for the Court not to interpret a saving clause as 
broadly as its language allows, especially when the Court professes that 
Congressional intent guides its statutory interpretation and that statutory 
language is the clearest indication of Congressional intent?147  At the very 
least, the Court should be cautious when using its judicial-lawmaking 
authority to restrict the scope of ERISA’s saving clause.  Along these 
lines, the Court should not use the Supremacy Clause to limit the reach 
of the saving clause. 
VI.  THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE DOES NOT RESTRICT THE SCOPE OF 
ERISA’S SAVING CLAUSE 
The Supremacy Clause provides: 
 
 145. Id. at 870 (quoting United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106 (2000)) (alteration 
in original). 
 146. Richard A. Posner, The Anti-Hero, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 24, 2003, at 27, 
30 (reviewing BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE LEGEND AND LIFE OF WILLIAM O. 
DOUGLAS (2003)) (emphasis added).  More fully, Judge Posner states: 
    The Supreme Court is a political court.  The discretion that the justices 
exercise can fairly be described as legislative in character, but the conditions 
under which this “legislature” operates are different from those of Congress.  
Lacking electoral legitimacy, yet wielding Zeus’s thunderbolt in the form of 
the power to invalidate actions of the other branches of government as 
unconstitutional, the justices, to be effective, have to accept certain limitations 
on their legislative discretion.  They are confined, in Holmes’s words, from 
molar to molecular motions.  And even at the molecular level the justices have 
to be able to offer reasoned justifications for departing from their previous 
decisions, and to accord a decent respect to public opinion, and to allow room 
for social experimentation, and to formulate doctrines that will provide 
guidance to lower courts, and to comply with the expectations of the legal 
profession concerning the judicial craft.  They have to be seen to be doing law 
rather than doing politics. 
Id. 
 147. See supra text accompanying note 65. 
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This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.148 
It appears that the Court may try to use the Supremacy Clause to limit 
the application of ERISA’s saving clause.  In asserting that a saving 
clause in a federal statute cannot be used to destroy the substantive 
provisions of the federal statute,149 the Court’s reasoning appears to be 
based upon two propositions.  The first proposition involves whether 
Congress intended that a saving clause-protected law preempts a 
substantive provision of a federal statute.  The other is whether the 
Supremacy Clause prevents Congress from enacting saving clauses in 
federal laws that exempt state laws from federal preemption when the 
state laws conflict with the federal laws’ substantive provisions. 
Regarding the first proposition, the plain meaning language of 
ERISA’s preemption and saving clauses shows that Congress did intend 
that a saving clause-protected state law can preempt certain ERISA 
substantive provisions, including § 1132(a).150  It should be noted that 
the Court has already recognized that the interplay between ERISA’s 
preemption clause and saving clause is unusual in that Congress does not 
normally take away an area of regulation from the states, as done in 
ERISA’s preemption clause, and then return a portion of that regulation 
to the states, as done in ERISA’s saving clause.151  However, implicit 
from the fact that Congress included ERISA’s saving clause within 
ERISA’s statutory framework is the notion that Congress intended that 
some state laws avoid ERISA’s preemption.  The only open issue is 
whether Congress intended that courts interpret and apply ERISA’s 
saving clause as broadly as the language contained in ERISA’s 
preemption clause and saving clause.  As argued above, a plain meaning 
 
 148. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2. 
 149. See supra text accompanying note 90. 
 150. See supra text accompanying note 73. 
 151. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739–40 (1985).  The 
Court stated: 
The two pre-emption sections, while clear enough on their faces, perhaps are 
not a model of legislative drafting, for while the general pre-emption clause 
broadly pre-empts state law, the saving clause appears broadly to preserve the 
States’ lawmaking power over much of the same regulation.  While Congress 
occasionally decides to return to the States what it has previously taken away, 
it does not normally do both at the same time. 
Id. 
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interpretation of ERISA’s preemption clause and saving clause provides 
that Congress intended that ERISA’s saving clause be broadly applied, 
with ERISA’s deemer clause being the only limitation on the scope of 
the saving clause,152 a position that the Court accepted in its earlier cases 
where the scope of ERISA’s saving clause was interpreted.153  
Therefore, given Congress’ explicit intent regarding the scope of 
ERISA’s saving clause, the Court should not use the Supremacy Clause 
to thwart that intent. 
In considering whether the Supremacy Clause prevents the enforcement 
of a broad, plain meaning interpretation of ERISA’s saving clause, the 
Court should be mindful that the Supremacy Clause has different 
implications depending upon the types of federal and state laws at issue.  
One category of federal laws is comprised of laws that regulate areas 
that the United States Constitution explicitly reserves for federal control.  
Such exclusive federal regulation includes such areas as the authority to 
make treaties with foreign countries and the authority to coin money.154  
In these and other exclusive areas of federal regulation, Congress could 
not enact a law or a saving clause that would give states the authority to 
make treaties, coin money, or do anything else that would contravene an 
explicit constitutional provision.155  Instead, only an amendment to the 
constitution would avoid a preemption of a state law that is in conflict 
with an explicit constitutional provision.156  One might call this type of 
federal preemption “explicit federal preemption.” 
On the other hand, when there is no explicit constitutional provision 
that proscribes state laws in a particular area, the Supremacy Clause 
should not prevent Congress from enacting federal laws that contain 
saving clauses that relegate certain areas for state law control, as 
Congress did when enacting ERISA’s saving clause.  Instead of “explicit 
federal preemption,” one might call this area of preemption “discretionary 
federal preemption.”  The preemption is discretionary because, while 
legislating in areas within its legislative authority, Congress should have 
great discretion when deciding whether it should preempt state laws or 
whether it should allow state law regulation in certain areas.  To deny 
Congress such discretion would be inconsistent with Congress’ powers 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause to make those laws that it deems 
necessary to carry out its constitutional legislative authority.157 
 
 152. See supra text accompanying notes 73–79. 
 153. See supra text accompanying notes 29–41. 
 154. TRIBE, supra note 130, at 1021. 
 155. See id. 
 156. See id. at 1021–23 n.5. 
 157. The Necessary and Proper Clause provides that Congress shall have the power 
“[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
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Before eroding Congress’ powers to save certain state laws from 
federal preemption, the Court should interpret the Supremacy Clause in 
light of the fears, concerns, and purposes that motivated the founders to 
include the Supremacy Clause as a part of the proposed U.S. Constitution.  
For example, in Federalist Paper No. 33, Alexander Hamilton spoke of the 
interconnection between the Necessary and Proper Clause and the 
Supremacy Clause; and, the gist of his discussion is that the founders 
devised these clauses to ensure that states would not enact laws that 
would destroy or undermine the national government’s supreme 
authority to create necessary and proper federal laws.158  Hamilton states: 
The Convention probably foresaw what it has been a principal aim of these 
papers to inculcate that the danger which most threatens our political welfare, is, 
that the State Governments will finally sap the foundations of the Union; and 
might therefore think it necessary, in so cardinal a point, to leave nothing to 
construction.159 
The debate among the founders during the drafting of the Federal 
Constitution shows that Hamilton’s comments are correct.  One of the 
founders’ chief motivating reasons for drafting the Supremacy Clause 
was to prevent states from entering into treaties with foreign countries, 
from violating treaties that the federal government might enter into with 
foreign countries, and from enacting state laws that conflicted with 
federal laws that Congress might enact.160  It appears that, in drafting the 
 
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of 
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 
18. 
 158. THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 204–05 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961). 
 159. Id. at 205–06. 
 160. 2 1787 DRAFTING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 1459–60 (Wilbourn E. Benton ed., 
1986).  The notes of some of the founders show that the Supremacy Clause was 
primarily motivated by state laws that attempted to undermine federal authority: 
   MR. PINCKNEY moved “that the National Legislature should have authority to 
negative all laws which they should judge to be improper.”  He urged that such 
a universality of the power was indispensably necessary to render it effectual; 
that the States must be kept in due subordination to the nation; that if the States 
were left to act of themselves in any case, it would be impossible to defend the 
national prerogatives, however extensive they might be on paper; that the acts 
of Congress had been defeated by this means; nor had foreign treaties escaped 
repeated violations; that this universal negative was in fact the corner stone of 
an efficient national Government; that under the British Government the 
negative of the Crown had been found beneficial, and the States are more one 
nation now, than the Colonies were then. 
Id. at 1459.  Additionally, the notes show the following: 
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Supremacy Clause, the founders were attempting to promote the 
supremacy of the federal government over hostile state governments; 
they were mindful that some states would resist federal authority and 
seek to promote their own political and economic well-being to the 
detriment of the federal government.161  Therefore,  instead of interpreting 
ERISA’s saving clause and the Supremacy Clause’s impact on the 
saving clause in a vacuum, the Court should construe the Supremacy 
Clause in light of the anti-state encroachment on federal authority policy 
that motivated the founders’ drafting of the Supremacy Clause.  In doing 
so, the Court should acknowledge that the anti-state encroachment 
policy is not implicated when Congress enacts a federal statute like 
ERISA which contains a broad saving clause that allows states to enact 
laws that preempt some of ERISA’s statutory provisions. 
The policy underlying the Supremacy Clause is not implicated because 
the founders did not appear to be concerned with Congress itself granting 
states, through a saving clause, the authority to operate in particular 
areas that do not conflict with constitutional provisions that explicitly 
and exclusively reserve certain areas for federal regulation.162  Rather, 
 
   MR. MADISON seconded the motion.  He could not but regard an indefinite 
power to negative legislative acts of the States as absolutely necessary to a 
perfect system.  Experience had evinced a constant tendency in the States to 
encroach on the federal authority; to violate national Treaties; to infringe the 
rights and interests of each other; to oppress the weaker party within their 
respective jurisdictions. 
Id.  See also JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 
1787, at 142 (1966) (discussing the states’ violations of federal treaties with foreign 
countries and, in part, stating as follows: “The tendency of the States to these violations 
has been manifested in sundry instances”). 
After much debate over whether to give the federal government the power to review 
and negate an improper state law before it became an enforceable law, the founders 
decided against such a power, but they apparently drafted the Supremacy Clause to 
achieve the same result—a means of preventing states from undermining the federal 
government by enacting inconsistent state laws and by making and violating treaties with 
foreign governments.  See 2 1787 DRAFTING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, supra, at 1468–82. 
 161. 2 1787 DRAFTING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 160, at 1461.  Mr. Wilson, 
one of the founders, states: 
No sooner were the State Governments formed than their jealousy and 
ambition began to display themselves.  Each endeavoured to cut a slice from 
the common loaf, to add to its own morsel, till at length the confederation 
became frittered down to the impotent condition in which it now stands.  
Review the progress of the articles of Confederation through Congress and 
compare the first and last draught of it.  To correct its vices is the business of 
this convention.  One of its vices is the want of an effectual controul in the 
whole over its parts.  What danger is there that the whole will unnecessarily 
sacrifice a part?  But reverse the case, and leave the whole at the mercy of each 
part, and will not the general interest be continually sacrificed to local 
interests? 
Id. at 1461–62. 
 162. See id. at 1450–82. 
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the founders’ concern was with states enacting inconsistent laws and 
violating treaties, in opposition to Congress’ intent, when such state 
action was in contravention of a system of government based upon the 
supremacy of federal authority and laws.163 
Furthermore, a court interpretation that Congress cannot enact a 
federal statute that has a saving clause, which saves certain state laws 
from preemption, would undermine Congress’ authority under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.164  Such a decision would substantially 
limit Congress’ discretion and ability to enact the types of laws that it 
deems necessary to protect its citizens.  Congress would have less authority 
to strike the appropriate balance between state regulation and federal 
regulation.  For example, in the ERISA context, Congress could no 
longer enforce its desire for complete state regulation of insurance, 
despite its apparent policy choice that states are in a better position to 
regulate insurance.165  Clearly, ERISA’s saving clause’s mandate—that 
states can regulate insurance—is a policy decision that Congress has 
made to further its legislative authority to regulate ERISA plans for the 
protection of its citizens.  If Congress thinks that it is necessary and 
proper for it to defer to state authority regarding insurance regulations, 
the Supremacy Clause should not be used to prevent or limit Congress’  
discretion in deciding the best means of protecting its citizens’ ERISA 
plans.  This is especially true because ERISA’s saving clause is not 
within the scope of “explicit federal preemption,” as the saving clause 
does not conflict with any provisions of the U.S. Constitution.  
Therefore, the Supremacy Clause is not implicated because its anti-state 
encroachment policy is not harmed when Congress, in its wisdom as the 
federal legislative body, and not a state government, has allowed state 
regulation in a particular area. 
The Court should recognize that the real justification for its prior 
dictum, that an ERISA saving clause-protected law will not preempt an 
inconsistent ERISA statutory provision, is the Court’s misguided efforts 
to enforce the Supremacy Clause when the Supremacy Clause is really 
not implicated in this area of discretionary federal preemption.166  The 
 
 163. See id. 
 164. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
 165. This conclusion flows from the mere fact that Congress included the saving 
clause in ERISA’s statutory framework. 
 166. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 377 (2002) (“Although 
we have yet to encounter a forced choice between the congressional policies of 
exclusively federal remedies and the ‘reservation of the business of insurance to the 
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Court’s effort is misguided because, in the zone of discretionary federal 
preemption, the Supremacy Clause has no legal force or effect that is 
separate and distinct from Congress’ intent regarding the permissible 
scope of state law regulation.167  When discretionary federal preemption 
is applicable, the terms and conditions of federal statutes are the 
cornerstone of a federal preemption analysis under the Supremacy 
Clause.168  If Congress wants inconsistent state law regulation in a 
certain field, the Supremacy Clause does not prevent Congress from 
drafting a statute that allows such inconsistent state law regulation.169  
 
States,’ [Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 744 n.21 (1985)], we have 
anticipated such a conflict, with the state insurance regulation losing out if it allows plan 
participants ‘to obtain remedies . . . that Congress rejected in ERISA.’”) (quoting Pilot 
Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987)); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 100 (1993) (asserting that “in the case of a direct 
conflict [between a state law and one of ERISA’s statutory provisions], federal 
supremacy principles require that state law yield”) (citation omitted).  See also Caleb 
Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 234 (2000) (“As the Supreme Court and 
virtually all commentators have acknowledged, the Supremacy Clause is the reason that 
valid federal statutes trump state law.”).  But see Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of 
Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 785 (1994) (asserting that “[t]he Necessary and 
Proper Clause, and not the Supremacy Clause, provides the source and constitutional 
justification for Congress’s power to preempt state lawmaking capacity”). 
 167. In Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, the Court stated: 
   We must decide whether these provisions [including ERISA’s preemption 
clause, section 1140, and section 502(a) of ERISA’s civil enforcement 
provision], singly or in combination, pre-empt the cause of action at issue in 
this case. “[T]he question whether a certain state action is pre-empted by 
federal law is one of congressional intent. ‘The purpose of Congress is the 
ultimate touchstone.’” 
498 U.S. 133, 137–38 (1990) (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 
(1985)) (emphasis added). 
 168. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 169. As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court has recognized the possibility that 
Congress can enact a federal statute with a saving clause that preserves state laws that 
are inconsistent with a statute’s substantive provisions: 
Insofar as petitioners’ argument would permit common-law actions that 
“actually conflict” with federal regulations, it would take from those who 
would enforce a federal law the very ability to achieve the law’s 
congressionally mandated objectives that the Constitution, through the 
operation of ordinary pre-emption principles, seeks to protect.  To the extent 
that such an interpretation of the saving provision reads into a particular 
federal law toleration of a conflict that those principles would otherwise forbid, 
it permits that law to defeat its own objectives, or potentially, as the Court has 
put it before, to “destroy itself.”  [Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., 
Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 228 (1998).]  We do not claim that Congress lacks the 
constitutional power to write a statute that mandates such a complex type of 
state/federal relationship.  But there is no reason to believe Congress has done 
so here. 
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 872 (2000) (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted). 
In support of the possibility that Congress has the authority to enact a saving clause 
under which state law can preempt federal law, as shown in the above quote, the Court 
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And, if Congress wants to create a saving clause, like ERISA’s saving 
clause, which provides for state law preemption of such ERISA statutory 
provisions as § 1132(a), the Supremacy Clause would not block the 
enforcement of such a law.170  This is true because the Supremacy 
 
relied upon footnote 16, which provides: 
   The Court contends, in essence, that a saving clause cannot foreclose implied 
conflict pre-emption.  The cases it cites to support that point, however, merely 
interpreted the language of the particular saving clauses at issue and concluded 
that those clauses did not foreclose implied pre-emption; they do not establish 
that a saving clause in a given statute cannot foreclose implied pre-emption 
based on frustration of that statute’s purposes, or even (more importantly for 
our present purposes) that a saving clause in a given statute cannot deprive a 
regulation issued pursuant to that statute of any implicit pre-emptive effect.  As 
stated in the text, I believe the language of this particular saving clause 
unquestionably limits, and possibly forecloses entirely, the pre-emptive effect 
that safety standards promulgated by the Secretary have on common-law 
remedies.  Under that interpretation, there is by definition no frustration of 
federal purposes—that is, no “tolerat[ion of] actual conflict,”—when tort suits 
are allowed to go forward. Thus, because there is a textual basis for concluding 
that Congress intended to preserve the state law at issue, I think it entirely 
appropriate for the party favoring pre-emption to bear a special burden in 
attempting to show that valid federal purposes would be frustrated if that state 
law were not pre-empted. 
 Id. at 900 n.16 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 170. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.  Professor Laurence H. Tribe has 
expressed his opinion that the McCarran-Ferguson Act, in which Congress relegated the 
business of insurance to state law regulation (and pursuant to which Congress enacted 
ERISA’s saving clause), possibly runs afoul of the Supremacy Clause.  TRIBE, supra 
note 130, at 1022 n.5.  Professor Tribe states: 
   An important federal statute that comes close to raising that constitutional 
difficulty (and, indeed, perhaps crosses the line) is the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b), which protects certain kinds of state laws—namely, 
those enacted “for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance”—from 
being “invalidated[d], impair[ed], or supersede[d]” by any other federal statute, 
including one enacted by a future Congress, that does not “specifically relat[e] 
to the business of insurance.”  If McCarran-Ferguson were read as its text 
plainly suggests Congress meant it to be—as giving certain insurance-related 
state laws a privileged place with respect to statutes promulgated by future 
Congresses—it would violate both the principle that Congress may not by 
statute repeal the Supremacy Clause and the principle that one Congress may 
not bind its successors. Perhaps to avoid this awkward result, the courts have 
characterized McCarran-Ferguson as merely an interpretive guide for assessing 
the preemptive effect of federal statutes—and a guide which future Congresses 
may freely override. 
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b)) (alterations in original).  However, Professor Tribe 
does recognize that Congress can avoid violation of the Supremacy Clause by 
incorporating the relevant state law regulation into the relevant federal statute: 
   To be precise, because the Supremacy Clause entails the conclusion that any 
valid federal statute prevails over any state law with which it conflicts, 




including a state law enacted for the purpose of regulating the insurance 
business regardless of whether that federal statute deals specifically with the 
business of insurance, the only clearly constitutional way that Congress can 
preserve a state law regulating insurance from being overridden by a statute 
Congress enacts that conflicts with the state law is to eliminate the conflict by 
specifying, in the congressional statute itself, that state laws such as the one in 
question are to remain operative, thereby essentially incorporating the state 
law in question into the federal statute. . . .  For Congress to attempt to alter 
the background rule under which any federal statute automatically supersedes 
any state law with which it conflicts—which is, after all, a rule of 
constitutional law giving operative meaning to the Supremacy Clause itself—is 
for Congress to seek to do by statute what the Constitution clearly requires an 
amendment to accomplish. 
Id. at 1023 n.5 (emphasis added). 
Under Professor Tribe’s rationale, Congress’ enactment of ERISA’s saving clause, 
which is premised upon the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s relegation of the business of 
insurance to state law regulation, survives preemption by the Supremacy Clause.  This is 
because, by including ERISA’s saving clause within ERISA’s statutory provisions, 
Congress, through the saving clause, has incorporated state law regulation of insurance 
within ERISA’s statutory framework, thereby making state law regulation of insurance a 
part of ERISA’s substantive provisions.  Given the incorporation of state law regulation 
of insurance into ERISA’s statutory scheme, the only remaining question should be 
whether Congress intended that ERISA’s saving clause be interpreted such that, in 
regulating insurance, states can offer compensatory and punitive damages that are not 
allowable under § 1132(a) of ERISA’s statutory provisions.  Pursuant to a plain meaning 
interpretation of ERISA’s preemption clause and saving clause, the answer is that 
Congress did intend states to have the authority to grant such damages.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 73–79. 
This Author accepts Professor Tribe’s incorporation theory, as informed by a plain 
meaning interpretation of the scope of ERISA’s saving clause and ERISA’s preemption 
clause which, as argued above, would allow a state to grant compensatory and punitive 
damages despite the fact that these damages are not allowable under § 1132(a).  
However, this Author believes that another way of resolving the issue is by accepting 
that, when Congress enacted  ERISA’s preemption clause and saving clause, it attempted 
to make a distinction between ERISA plans that are regulated by state law under the 
saving clause and ERISA plans that are not regulated by state law under the saving 
clause.  Given the distinction, the next logical conclusion is that Congress intended that 
ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions be applicable only when an ERISA plan is not 
subject to state law regulation under ERISA’s saving clause.  This conclusion is 
appropriate because it is consistent with the plain meaning language of ERISA’s 
preemption clause and saving clause, and because it is the one interpretation that would 
enforce ERISA and its saving clause to the fullest extent of its permissible construction.   
Furthermore, the Court has already recognized that, through ERISA’s saving clause, 
states can regulate insurance ERISA plans (that are funded with insurance policies and 
with HMOs’ coverage that is insurance-like) and that states cannot regulate self-insured 
ERISA plans because such a distinction is the best reconciliation of the mandates of 
ERISA’s saving clause and deemer clause.  Consistent with that distinction, the Court 
should acknowledge that, to give full force and effect to the plain meaning language of 
ERISA’s saving clause, preemption clause, and to § 1132(a)’s civil enforcement 
provisions, the best interpretation is that § 1132(a) remedies apply only to self-insured 
plans and to other plans that do not fall within the scope of permissible state law 
regulation of insurance under ERISA’s saving clause.  Consistently, when an ERISA 
plan does fall within a permissible state regulation of insurance under ERISA’s saving 
clause, the Court should hold that § 1132(a) is not applicable and that states are free to 
provide compensatory and punitive damage remedies to an injured beneficiary. This 
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Clause is not self-executing to the extent that a federal statute must 
always preempt inconsistent state laws, even when Congress—through 
its intent as expressed in the language of saving clauses—wants to 
preserve the inconsistent state laws.  The conclusion is all the more true 
when one interprets the Supremacy Clause in light of its anti-state 
encroachment policy, which is not implicated and should not be used to 
override a Congressional enactment when Congress, in the exercise of 
its “discretionary federal preemption” authority, has struck a balance in 
favor of state law regulation even when, as with ERISA’s saving clause, 
the state law might preempt ERISA’s statutory provisions. 
Given the above discussion, it seems logical that a saving clause and a 
preemption clause, regardless of the scope of their coverage, are the 
decisive authority for determining when federal preemption occurs.  
Another way of saying this is that, when a federal statute’s saving clause 
exempts certain state laws from federal preemption, it is as if the federal 
statute no longer applies to the exempted areas of state law regulation.171  
And therefore, the Supremacy Clause would not mandate federal 
preemption of those exempted state laws because the Supremacy Clause 
requires preemption only when a federal statue is applicable and when 
 
distinction between when § 1132(a) is applicable, and when it is not applicable, gives the 
fullest meaning to the language of ERISA’s preemption clause and saving clause, just as 
the distinction between insurance plans and self-insurance plans give the broadest 
meaning to ERISA’s saving clause and deemer clause. 
Furthermore, Professor Tribe appears to be of the opinion that a court should strictly 
interpret a federal statute’s saving clause to enforce Congress’ intent against preemption 
of state laws that fall within the saving clause’s scope: 
To engage in such a broader inquiry is to forget that preemption is ultimately a 
matter of construing a federal statute; when the statute contains its own clearly 
applicable preemption or anti-preemption provision, a court that fails to give 
that provision dispositive effect and instead applies its own preemption criteria 
is illegitimately disregarding the source of its authority and, regardless of 
where its preemption inquiry leads, is pursuing a fundamentally lawless path. 
TRIBE, supra note 130, at 1181 n.10 (emphasis added). 
 171. Professor Tribe appears to say that, instead of the federal statute not being 
applicable to the areas that have been relegated to state regulation, the federal statute 
incorporates the state law.  TRIBE, supra note 130, at 1023 n.5.  However, in the context 
of whether a saving clause-protected state law preempts § 1132(a), analytically it might 
be better to say that § 1132(a), and the other provisions of subchapters I and III of 
ERISA, are not applicable because ERISA’s preemption clause states that § 1132(a) and 
the provisions of subchapters I and III supersede (are applicable) “[e]xcept as provided 
in subsection (b) of this section,” subsection (b) being ERISA’s saving clause.  29 U.S.C. 
§ 1144(a) (2000).  The gist of this statement is that such ERISA provisions are not 
applicable if a state law falls within the scope of ERISA’s saving clause. 
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there is an inconsistent state law that is not saved from preemption.172 
This conclusion applies to ERISA’s saving clause and to whether a 
state law can preempt § 1132(a).  More specifically, an ERISA’s saving 
clause-protected state law that imposes remedies that are different than  
the remedies that § 1132(a) imposes should not be preempted by § 1132(a) 
because § 1132(a) is not applicable, given that Congress—through ERISA’s 
saving clause and ERISA’s preemption clause—gave states the authority 
to regulate insurance, which should include the regulation of the 
remedies to which an injured beneficiary is entitled.173 
To the extent that the Court, through an alleged statutory construction, 
attempts to apply the Supremacy Clause to thwart Congress’ intent 
regarding ERISA’s saving clause and state law regulation of insurance, 
this would be impermissible judicial lawmaking.  The Court has no 
legitimate authority to overrule Congressional intent by making its own 
laws that are premised upon its own beliefs about the proper balance to 
be struck in areas involving public policy choices that Congress has 
resolved in favor of state law regulation of insurance.174 
In the final analysis, it should be noted that using the Supremacy 
Clause to prevent an expansive application of ERISA’s saving clause, 
one which preempts § 1132(a) of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions, 
would be inconsistent with the Court’s precedents regarding federal 
preemption.  In the ERISA context, as in other areas of the law, the Court 
has considered issues regarding a federal statute’s preemption of state 
law as a matter of statutory interpretation or construction of the relevant 
federal statute.175  The decisive question has been whether Congress, in the 
 
 172. In other words, if Congress, by reserving certain areas for state law regulation, 
intends that federal law not control in such areas, there will be no conflict between the 
state law and the federal law because, in those areas, the federal law is inapplicable and 
nonexistent; therefore, there is no applicable federal law to conflict with the saved state 
law.  
 173. See supra text accompanying notes 73–79.  § 1132(a) is not applicable because 
the clear and plain language of ERISA’s preemption clause provides that § 1132(a),  
being a section of subchapter one, shall not preempt state laws that fall within the scope 
of ERISA’s saving clause.  See id. 
 174. Cf. TRIBE, supra note 130, at 1181 n.10 (asserting that “when the statute  
contains its own clearly applicable preemption or anti-preemption provision, a 
court that fails to give that provision dispositive effect and instead applies its 
own preemption criteria is illegitimately disregarding the source of its 
authority and, regardless of where its preemption inquiry leads, is pursuing a 
fundamentally lawless path.”). 
Id. 
 175. For an example of the Court’s reliance on statutory construction in the ERISA 
preemption context, see New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans 
v. Travelers Insurance, 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995) (asserting that “[s]ince pre-emption 
claims turn on Congress’s intent, we begin as we do in any exercise of statutory 
construction with the text of the provision in question, and move on, as need be, to the 
structure and purpose of the Act in which it occurs”) (citation omitted); Pilot Life Ins. 
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statute’s language, legislative history, or structure of the statute, intended 
to preempt state law in a particular area.176  If the statute’s language is 
clear as to Congressional intent, the Court mostly defers to that intent.177  
The same should apply for issues involving ERISA’s saving clause’s 
preemptive effects on § 1132(a) of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions.  
Therefore, if the Court continues using statutory construction as a means 
of determining ERISA’s preemption and saving clause issues, and if it 
applies its rule that unambiguous statutory provisions should be 
interpreted as written,178 the Court would be justified in holding that, 
pursuant to a plain meaning interpretation, Congress intended that a 
saving clause-protected state law preempts § 1132(a) of ERISA’s civil 
enforcement provisions.179 
The Court should recognize that if Congress had wanted to limit the 
reach of ERISA’s saving clause, such that a saving clause-protected state 
law would be preempted if it conflicts with § 1132(a), then Congress 
would have written such a limitation into the language of either ERISA’s 
preemption clause or saving clause.  For example, Congress wrote the 
limitation into the saving clause contained in section 78bb(a) of the 
 
Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45 (1987) (stating that “[t]he question whether a certain 
state action is pre-empted by federal law is one of congressional intent. ‘The purpose of 
Congress is the ultimate touchstone’”) (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 
202, 208 (1985)).  In the non-ERISA context, for examples of the Court’s use of 
statutory construction, see Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001) 
(“In these cases, our task is to identify the domain expressly pre-empted, because ‘an 
express definition of the pre-emptive reach of a statute . . . supports a reasonable 
inference . . . that Congress did not intend to pre-empt other matters.’  Congressional 
purpose is the ‘ultimate touchstone’ of our inquiry.”) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett 
Group, 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485–86 (1996) 
(“‘[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ in every pre-emption case.  
[Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516.]  As a result, any understanding of the scope of a pre-
emption statute must rest primarily on ‘a fair understanding of congressional purpose.’  
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 530.  Congress’ intent, of course, primarily is discerned from the 
language of the pre-emption statute and the ‘statutory framework’ surrounding it.”) 
(quoting Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 111 (1992) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring)). 
 176. See Travelers Ins., 514 U.S. at 655 (asserting that “[s]ince pre-emption claims 
turn on Congress’s intent, we begin as we do in any exercise of statutory construction 
with the text of the provision in question, and move on, as need be, to the structure and 
purpose of the Act in which it occurs”) (citations omitted).  
 177. See supra text accompanying note 63. 
 178. See id. 
 179. It should be noted that, in drafting ERISA’s preemption clause and saving 
clause, Congress did not put any limitations on the scope of the saving clause, other than 
ERISA’s deemer clause.  See supra text accompanying notes 73–79. 
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which preserves state jurisdiction over 
“any security or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the 
provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder.”180  If 
Congress could write such a limitation into a 1934 statute, then there is 
no reason to believe that it could not have written the limitation into a 
1974 statute like ERISA.  The analogy of section 78bb(a) to an absence 
of the same limitation in ERISA’s saving clause is persuasive.  When the 
analogy is considered in light of the plain, unambiguous language of 
ERISA’s preemption clause and saving clause, the Court should hold 
that Congress did not intend that § 1132(a) be a limitation on the 
enforcement of a saving clause-protected state law that offers remedies 
that are different than the remedies offered by § 1132(a).  In other words, 
ERISA’s preemption clause and saving clause clearly show Congress’  
intent that a saving clause-protected state law preempts § 1132(a) of 
ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions. 
As a final point, to the extent that the Court might try to say that the 
“structure and purpose of [ERISA] as a whole,” and the Court’s 
“reasoned understanding of the way in which Congress intended the 
statute and its surrounding regulatory scheme to affect business, 
consumers, and the law,”181 show a Congressional intent that § 1132(a) 
preempts an inconsistent saving clause-protected law, the Court should 
use caution by acknowledging at least two of the principles that have 
controlled its discretion when deciding whether Congress intended to 
preempt state law.  First, there is a presumption that Congress did not 
intend to preempt traditional state police powers regulations unless 
Congress’ intent is clearly and manifestly shown.182  In light of this 
presumption, the Court should resolve any ambiguity, about whether § 
1132(a) preempts an inconsistent saving clause-protected state law, 
 
 180. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (emphasis added).  
Section 78bb(a), in relevant parts, provides: 
[N]othing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities 
commission (or any agency or officer performing like functions) of any State 
over any security or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the 
provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 181. See Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 476 (1996) (asserting that “[a]lso 
relevant, however, is the ‘structure and purpose of the statute as a whole,’ as revealed not 
only in the text, but through the reviewing court’s reasoned understanding of the way in 
which Congress intended the statute and its surrounding regulatory scheme to affect 
business, consumers, and the law”) (quoting Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 
505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992)). 
 182. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers 
Ins., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995) (“[W]e have worked on the ‘assumption that the historic 
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was 
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
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against such preemption.183  Along these lines, to the extent that the Court 
does not accept that a plain meaning interpretation of ERISA’s preemption 
clause and saving clause shows a Congressional intent that a saving 
clause-protected law can preempt § 1132(a)’s remedies, at a minimum 
the Court should recognize that Congress’ inclusion of a broad saving 
clause within ERISA’s statutory framework, when § 1132(a) exists in 
the same framework, shows that there is ambiguity regarding Congress’  
intent as to whether § 1132(a) preempts a saving clause-protected law.  
Therefore, the Court should apply the presumption against preemption of 
the state law and construe ERISA’s preemption clause and saving clause 
to the fullest extent of their plain meaning language.184 
Second, any attempt by the Court (other than one applying the presumption 
against preemption) to resolve any alleged ambiguity over the preemptive 
effects of § 1132(a), by using the Court’s “reasoned understanding of the 
way in which Congress intended the statute and its surrounding regulatory 
scheme to affect business, consumers, and the law,”185 is doomed to fail.  
Not only will such an attempt lead to judicial lawmaking where the 
Court, itself, will make the public policy decision regarding how the 
balance should be struck regarding § 1132(a)’s preemptive effect,186 but 
such an attempt to save Congress from its own failure to more clearly 
draft the preemption clause and saving clause—to the extent that a plain 
 
 183. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 592 n.1 (2001).   
The principles of federalism and respect for state sovereignty that underlie the 
Court’s reluctance to find pre-emption where Congress has not spoken directly 
to the issue apply with equal force where Congress has spoken, though 
ambiguously.  In such cases, the question is not whether Congress intended to 
pre-empt state regulation, but to what extent.  We do not, absent unambiguous 
evidence, infer a scope of pre-emption beyond that which clearly is mandated 
by Congress’ language. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
It should be noted that the position taken in this Article is that ERISA’s preemption 
clause and saving clause clearly and unambiguously show a congressional intent that a 
saving clause-protected state law can preempt §1132(a)’s remedies.  As such, this Article 
discusses any ambiguity that the Court might allege because of the inclusion of ERISA’s 
saving clause in the same statute that contains §1132(a) only as a fall-back position.  In 
other words, even if the Court were to find that ERISA is ambiguous regarding whether a 
saving clause-protected state law can preempt §1132(a), any such ambiguity should be 
construed in favor of a saving clause-protected state law’s preemption of §1132(a), 
pursuant to the presumption against the preemption of states’ police powers regulations. 
 184. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
 185. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 486. 
 186. For criticism of such judicial lawmaking by the Court when interpreting 
express preemption clauses and express saving clauses, see TRIBE, supra note 130, at 
1181 n.10. 
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meaning interpretation, as proposed in this Article, is not clear enough—will 
simply further delay the time when Congress will be forced to revisit 
ERISA’s statutory language and make whatever changes are needed to 
more clearly state its intent regarding the scope of ERISA’s preemption 
clause and saving clause, and these clauses’ impact on § 1132(a) of 
ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions.  As long as the Court continues 
to bail out Congress from the confusion surrounding ERISA’s preemption, 
there will be no urgency for Congress to clarify any ambiguity that 
currently exists in ERISA’s preemption framework.  Given that  Congress 
has shown that it can amend or change preemption clauses to make them 
more workable as time passes,187 the Court and lower-level federal courts, 
consistent with the presumption against preemption when Congress’ 
intent to preempt is not clear and manifest, should apply a plain meaning 
interpretation of ERISA’s preemption clause and saving clause, and hold 
that a saving clause-protected state law can preempt § 1132(a) of ERISA’s 
civil enforcement provisions. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
At some point in the future, the Court and lower-level federal courts 
will have to decide whether an ERISA’s saving clause-protected state 
law can preempt § 1132(a) of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions.  
This is one of the most important ERISA preemption issues that remains 
unresolved.  In resolving the issue, all courts should apply a plain meaning 
interpretation of ERISA’s preemption clause and saving clause.  Such an 
interpretation will be broader than what currently exists.  And, using that 
broad interpretation, some states might enact laws similar to the 
hypothetical statute that appears at the beginning of this Article.  States 
might codify such statutes to provide employees and their beneficiaries 
with a cause of action for compensatory and punitive damages stemming 
from an insurance company’s or HMO’s failure to follow the rules and 
procedures that such statutes mandate.  These compensatory and punitive 
damages will be very beneficial to many injured employees and 
beneficiaries who presently do not have access to such damages under § 
1132(a) of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions.188  The main theme of 
this Article is that states, pursuant to the plain meaning language of 
 
 187. A good example of Congress’ ability to amend or change preemption clauses is 
shown by Congress’ changing of the preemption clause contained in the Federal 
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1341 (2000).  See 
Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 541–45 (discussing the different changes that Congress 
has made to the FCLAA). 
 188. Under § 1132(a), an employee or beneficiary is entitled to only the monetary 
value of denied benefits and not to compensatory damages.  Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 
508 U.S. 248, 260–61 (1993). 
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ERISA’s saving clause and preemption clause, should have the authority 
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